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Summary: Names are central elements of people’s identities: they dis-
tinguish them from other individuals and play an important role in 
human self-determination. Names and their spelling reach, from time 
to time, national and European courtrooms. The European Union is no 
exception in this respect, as the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
proves. Unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the Luxembourg 
court avoids looking at the right to one’s name through the prism of 
fundamental rights but opts for internal market and EU citizenship 
reasoning. This article puts into context one of the latest EU citizenship 
cases on the right to one’s name, originating from the (lack of) ethnic 
minority rights protection in Lithuania. The Runevič-Vardyn case, in 
which the Court of Justice was called to balance EU citizens’ fun-
damental rights against national constitutional traditions to protect 
state language, also highlights the political and diplomatic tensions 
between Poland and Lithuania – two ‘young’ Member States with 
their unique post-Soviet history. This is only one of the many exam-
ples illustrating the intricate ethnic minority rights issues in many EU 
bordering Member States, which raises wider questions about the fu-
ture of European integration. Given the current national reform on the 
spelling of names in identity documents in Lithuania, it may well be 
that the change to improve the protection to one’s right to identity can 
come from within. The authors, however, propose that the Court takes 
a more coherent fundamental rights and proportionality approach on 
this matter. Hence, as a way out, they put forward a proposal for 
inclusive residence-based EU citizenship that is underpinned by the 
substantive equality of all EU citizens, no matter what their ethnic 
origin or mother tongue.
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1 Introduction
The right to one’s name is found explicitly regulated in a handful of 
legal acts. In general terms it is protected in international, national and 
EU law qua the right to human dignity, the right to private and family 
life, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination on the grounds of 
ethnic origin. If one were to assume that each human being has a right to 
determine what his or her cultural-ethnic identity is, this self-determina-
tion includes the individual choice for their name to be spelt in the lan-
guage they believe is part of their heritage. After all, ‘linguistic regulation 
and the promotion of particular languages naturally bring about indirect 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity’.1 At the same time, however, it 
should be acknowledged that such a right would fall within the category 
of qualified fundamental rights, ie rights that can be limited if they are 
in conflict with the rights of others. Conflicting legitimate interests could 
include collective rights, such as the right to protect a language. In situ-
ations where individual rights come into tension with collective rights, 
legislators and judges have to resolve conflicts by balancing or ranking 
the rights in question. No doubt, there is a plethora of dilemmas to face. 
In the EU context, this includes, inter alia, where and how this balance 
should be struck. Should national courts, when doing so, consider not 
only individual liberties (ie the right to one’s name), but also the policy 
implications that these decisions may have for the relations, including 
diplomatic ones, between Member States? Should the centre of gravity be 
on fundamental rights or EU citizenship? What implications may prior-
itising national social contracts, such as the use of a common language 
by a given society, have on the unity of the European Union?
It is notable that the rules on spelling of names are not within the 
competences attributed to the European Union.2 A contrario, they remain 
within the competence of the Member States. At the same time, however, 
the domestic authorities have the obligation to use their powers taking 
account of EU law. This, as experience proves, is not only a theoretical 
proposition, but a matter of practical importance, which has already led 
to the development of a particular ‘breed’ of EU law free movement cases. 
Although the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice is not very prolific, a 
clear picture emerges: national rules on the spelling of EU citizens’ names 
may constitute an obstacle to exercising their free movement rights. Even 
before the emergence of EU citizenship, the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice addressed how a different spelling could be deemed to be harmful 
1 D Kochenov and others, ‘Do Professional Linguistic Requirements Discriminate? A Legal 
Analysis: Estonia and Latvia in the Spotlight’ (2011) 10 EYMI 137.
2 See B De Witte and M Claes, ‘Competences: Codification and Contestation’ in A Łazowski 
and S Blockmans (eds), Research Handbook on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar 2016). 
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for one’s business,3 while in other cases the correct name itself was a 
matter of identity.4 It is worth noting that from the start the Luxembourg 
court focused on the internal market, and later directed its attention to 
the EU citizenship dimension of these cases. However, the judges shied 
away from exploring the fundamental rights angle. This is evident even 
in the post-Lisbon Treaty case Runevič-Vardyn,5 where the centre of grav-
ity, at least in theoretical terms, could have been the binding Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. As argued in this article, exploring further EU citi-
zenship was a safer option for the Court, as it allowed it to demonstrate 
the continuity of a particular line of case law and, by the same token, to 
strengthen the EU citizenship paradigm. At the same time, the judges did 
not risk being accused of competence creep qua the Charter. 
This article focuses largely on the Runevič-Vardyn case, which is 
an interesting development in a number of ways. To begin with, it is one 
of the most recent cases about the spelling of names to have reached 
the Court of Justice, raising questions of academic and practical impor-
tance. Furthermore, it is a case with an intriguing political background. 
It raised public debate in Lithuania and in Poland – two neighbouring 
Member States which joined the Union in 2004 and which share close 
historical and cultural roots, as well as bilateral political disagreements. 
Arguably, this particular reference for a preliminary ruling caught the 
Court of Justice between a rock and a hard place, forcing the judges 
to employ a ‘sense and sensibility’ approach. This is clearly visible in 
both the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen and the judgment of the 
Court of Justice. 
The analysis that follows is structured in the following way. First, we 
explore the broad picture of how the right to one’s name is regulated in 
international and EU law. The point of departure is several international 
conventions dealing with the right in question (section 2). This leads to an 
evaluation of the EU acquis, including the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice (section 3). In the next step the political legal background of the 
Runevič-Vardyn case is analysed (section 4). This part of the article sets 
the stage for an analysis of the case itself, as well as its importance for 
Polish-Lithuanian relations and the challenges it may pose for the future 
of European integration. In the last section of the article, we provide the 
necessary conceptual framework for a better understanding of the dif-
ficulty in reconciling fundamental freedoms and national constitutional 
traditions. The analysis focuses on EU citizenship serving as a facilitator 
3 Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig - Standesamt and Landratsamt 
Calw - Ordnungsamt ECLI:EU:C:1993:115.
4 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien ECLI:EU:C: 
2010:806.
5 Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto 
savivaldybės administracija and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:291.
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for integration and on the interaction of the Court and national courts 
vis-à-vis fundamental rights in the post-Lisbon legal environment of the 
European Union (section 5). 
2 The right to one’s name in international and EU law
2.1 A preliminary overview
As already mentioned in the introduction, the right to one’s name is 
provided for in several international treaties. A brief reminder is fitting 
that in a great majority of cases it is not a tailor-made explicitly regulated 
right, but rather falls within the parameters of human dignity, the right 
to private and family life, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination 
on the grounds of ethnic origin. 
In Europe, a leading international agreement that regulates the 
spelling of names of those belonging to national minorities in their origi-
nal language is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM).6 It was prepared in the mid 1990s under the aus-
pices of the Council of Europe.7 When this article went to print, out of 
twenty-eight EU Member States, twenty-four had ratified it8 and three are 
signatories though have not yet completed the ratification procedures.9 
France, one of the largest Member States, has neither signed nor ratified 
the Convention. Bearing in mind the Runevič-Vardyn case discussed in 
detail in this article, it is worth noting that both Lithuania and Poland 
became parties to the Convention in 2000. In terms of substance, Art 
11(1) of the Convention merits attention. It provides that ‘Every person 
belonging to a national minority has the right to use his or her surname 
(patronym) and first names in the minority language and the right to of-
ficial recognition of them’. This provision also outlines that the right in 
question is regulated ‘according to modalities provided for in [the] legal 
system [of the state Parties]’.10Arguably, it echoes the margin of apprecia-
6 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Article 10(5) of the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages provides: ‘The Parties undertake to allow the use or adoption of family 
names in the regional or minority languages, at the request of those concerned’. However, 
not all Member States are parties to it; hence its relevance is limited.
7 For a comprehensive analysis, see M Weller, The Rights of Minorities. A Commentary on 
the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (OUP 2005).
8 Bulgaria (1999), Cyprus (1996), the Czech Republic (1997), Denmark (1997), Estonia 
(1997), Finland (1997),  Germany (1997), Hungary (1995), Ireland (1999), Italy (1997), Lat-
via (2005), Liechtenstein (1997), Lithuania (2000), Malta (1998), the Netherlands (2005), 
Poland (2000), Portugal (2002), Romania (1995), the Slovak Republic (1995), Slovenia 
(1998), Spain (1995), Sweden (2000), the United Kingdom (1998).
9 Belgium (2001), Greece (1997), Luxembourg (1995).
10 Art 11(1) FCNM. For a commentary, see F de Varennes, ‘Use of Names and Signs’ in M 
Weller (ed), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (OUP 2005) 329–363.
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tion doctrine adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, which 
allows national idiosyncrasies to co-exist, as long as they do not breach 
the ECHR obligations.11 The Explanatory Report of the Framework Con-
vention confirms this view,12 and allows the Parties to ‘use the alphabet 
of their official language to write the name(s) of a person belonging to a 
national minority in its phonetic form’.13 The latter is the implementation 
of the Convention favoured by Lithuania.14
The right to one’s name also has prominence in general human rights 
conventions. At the global level, the UN International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is worth attention here as it provides in Article 24(2) 
for an explicit right to have a name.15 Indisputably, the most important 
legal act of that kind applicable in Europe is the European Convention on 
Human Rights.16 It makes no specific reference to the right to one’s name 
but, at the same time, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights proves that the right in question falls within the parameters 
of the right to family life guaranteed in Article 8.17 Although the European 
Union is a party to neither of those international conventions, they may 
have an impact on EU law qua the Charter of Fundamental Rights or gen-
eral principles of EU law (as per Article 6 TEU).18 This will change when 
the European Union accedes to the ECHR, which, as a result of Opinion 
2/13 of the Court of Justice, will now be considerably delayed.19 
11 See Mentzen v Latvia App no 71074/01 (ECtHR 7 December 2004) that adopts a similar 
flexible approach.
12 ‘In view of the practical implications of this obligation, the provision is worded in such a 
way as to enable Parties to apply it in the light of their own particular circumstances’, para 68.
13 ibid.
14 The Advisory Committee that evaluates the implementation of the Convention was criti-
cal of the Lithuanian approach, but did not establish any breach of the Convention. See A 
Račkauskaitė, ‘Tautinėms Mažumoms Priklausančių Asmenų Vardų Ir Pavardžių Vartoji-
mas: Tarptautinė Ir Lietuvos Respublikos Praktika [The Right to Use Names and Surnames 
in Minority Languages: International Practice and the Practice of the Republic of Lithuania]’ 
(2011) 3 Soc Stud 365, 375. 
15 See further, inter alia, S Joseph and others, The International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (OUP 2004).
16 For a commentary, see, inter alia, C Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human 
Rights: Commentary (CH Beck-Hart-Nomos 2014).
17 Change of names: Burghartz v Switzerland App no 16213/90 (ECtHR 22 February 
1994); Stjerna v Finland [1994] App no 18131/91 (ECtHR 25 November 1994). Naming 
children: Salonen v Finland App no 27868/95 (ECtHR 2 July 1997); Guillot v France App 
no 22500/93 (ECtHR 24 October 1993); Johansson v Finland App no 10163/02 (ECtHR 6 
September 2007). Linguistic form of name: Mentzen v Latvia App no 71074/01 (ECtHR 7 
December 2004).
18 For an overview on how the Court ‘discovered’ the general principle of fundamental 
rights protection to grant rights, see P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and 
Materials (OUP 2015) 383–84.
19 As per Article 6(1) TEU, the European Union will accede to the ECHR. An agreement to 
this end has been negotiated; however, in December 2014 the Court of Justice in Opinion 
2/13 held that the draft agreement was not compatible with EU law, particularly Article 
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As already noted, the law on the spelling of names of national mi-
norities is the domain of the Member States; the European Union has 
no competence here. Consequentially, there is no secondary legislation 
harmonising the rules on the spelling of names of national minorities.20 
However, as per well-established jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, 
the Member States – when exercising their domestic competence – must 
have regard to EU law. To put it differently, the primacy of EU law means 
that the Member States must ensure that their national laws do not in-
fringe any rights granted to citizens of the European Union by EU law.21 
In this context, the Charter of Fundamental Rights should be mentioned, 
as a large number of its provisions mirror the ECHR, including the right 
to family life, which is provided in Article 7 of the Charter.22 This, of 
course, does not mean that the European Union has a competence in the 
matter at hand, or that the right to one’s name stemming from the Char-
ter gives a self-sustained claim in national courts. As per Article 6 TEU, 
the Charter does not increase the competences of the European Union. 
This is confirmed in Article 51 of the Charter itself. Hence, in this context, 
the Charter may be only a useful tool for the interpretation of other pro-
visions laid down in EU primary or secondary legislation. Furthermore, 
Article 51 of the Charter makes it clear that the Charter applies when the 
Member States implement EU law.23 
CJEU case-law developments provide guidance on the matter. The 
Court, as we shall see, presumably because of evidence of the importance 
of the right to a name, included the right in its jurisprudence, but it did 
so by basing its judgments on fundamental (economic) freedoms, or the 
existence of an inconvenience in exercising the said freedoms. This, how-
6(1) TEU and Protocol No 8 to it. See further on the accession, P Gragl, The Accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2013). 
From a plethora of academic commentary on Opinion 2/13, see, inter alia, D Halberstam, 
‘“It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the 
ECHR, and the Way Forward’ (2015) 16 GLJ 105; Ch Krenn, ‘Autonomy and Effectiveness 
as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR Accession after Opinion 2/13’ (2015) 16 GLJ 147; S 
Øby Johansen, ‘The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and its Potential 
Consequences’ (2015) 16 GLJ 169; A Łazowski and RA Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn into 
Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’ (2015) 16 GLJ 179; 
S Peers, ‘The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare’ (2015) 16 GLJ 
213.
20 K Granickas, ‘Tautinių Mažumų Asmenvardžių Rašymas Lietuvoje: Kuriuo Keliu Eiti? 
[The Spelling of Names of Ethnic Minorities in Lithuania: Which Road to Choose?]’ Infolex.
lt (14 June 2011).
21 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
22 See, inter alia, J Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Article 7 (Private Life, Home and Communications)’ in 
S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (CH Beck-
Hart-Nomos 2014) 161–65.
23 For interpretation, see Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. See further, inter alia, E Hancox, ‘The Meaning of “Implementing” EU 
Law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1411.
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ever, is where for the time being the journey ends. The case law below 
demonstrates this evolutionary trajectory.
2.2 Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
2.2.1 Introduction
As the introduction to this paper has indicated, our names are central 
elements of our identities: they distinguish us from other individuals and 
play an important role in our self-determination.24 The Runevič-Vardyn 
case was not the first one to address such a potentially controversial is-
sue. In fact, the first case to do so was resolved by the Court before EU 
citizenship was even established, which could be an indication that a 
notion of EU citizenship was present long before the Treaty of Maastricht 
cemented it.25 While all these cases are analysed in depth later in this ar-
ticle, at this stage it is fitting to provide readers with general background 
information as a point of departure for the discussion of Runevič-Vardyn.
2.2.2 The Konstantinidis case
In Konstantinidis, the Court of Justice considered the case of a 
Greek national residing in Germany, whose name’s transliteration in Lat-
in characters was not consistent with the name’s phonetic pronunciation 
in Greek.26 Advocate General Jacobs argued that the right to have one’s 
name spelt in accordance with one’s wishes was a constitutional tradi-
tion of the Member States, and was a means to ensure the bearer’s ‘dig-
nity, moral integrity, and sense of personal identity’.27 Various references 
in national constitutions to dignity, in conjunction with one’s name, led 
the Advocate General to the conclusion that the right to a name was in-
deed a common constitutional tradition via its association with human 
dignity.28 The Court simply reiterated that that Member States could ex-
ercise their discretion when they decided how to transcribe a Greek name 
24 The tactic of penal systems to remove prisoners’ names and replace them with a number 
is evidence to this. 
25 FG Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union: A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 ELJ 591; P 
Stasinopoulos, ‘EU Citizenship as a Battle of the Concepts: Travailleur v Citoyen’ (2012) 4 
EJLS 74.
26 For an academic appraisal, see R Lawson, ‘Case C-168/91, Christos Konstantinidis v 
Stadt Altensteig-Standesamt, Judgment of 30 March 1993 [1993] 3 CMLR 401’ (1994) 31 
CML Rev 395.
27 Para 39 of the Opinion.
28 See Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syl-
logon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas 
and others ECLI:EU:C:1991:254. On the national constitutional importance of human dig-
nity, see Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürger-
meisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn ECLI:EU:C:2004:614 and Case C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v 
Greenpeace eV ECLI:EU:C:2011:669.
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using the Latin alphabet when introducing laws or other administrative 
measures, as long as this discretion did not infringe29 one’s right to exer-
cise fundamental freedoms. The CJEU essentially confirmed AG Jacobs’ 
analysis on the existence of indirect discrimination, but did not, as the 
AG did, engage in a discussion of fundamental rights or arguments for 
an extended personal scope of the free movement of workers that sees 
humans not simply as production factors,30 a reasoning indicative of the 
later transition from the concept of a worker to that of a citizen. 
2.2.3 The García Avello case
The issue of names re-emerged in the post-citizenship and post-Mar-
tìnez Sala31 period, in the García Avello case.32 Mr Avello and his Belgian 
wife applied to amend their children’s names so that they consisted of 
two surnames, the father’s and the mother’s, as per Spanish custom. 
Belgian law did not allow for the said amendment, unless under excep-
tional circumstances. AG Jacobs included in his Opinion a passage on 
the pluralism of name regimes in the Union, demonstrating the difficulty 
of establishing a common ground at EU level. As in Konstantinidis, it was 
made clear that the Member States retained the right to regulate issues 
such as the one at hand; however, the Advocate General acknowledged 
both the potential practical difficulties which the children might encoun-
ter because of the various versions of their surname, and the fact that 
citizenship of the Union provided broader protection. The Court, indicat-
29 Infringement, or breach, is interpreted widely, often employing the ‘market access’ test. See 
120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 
(the free movement of goods); Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co Ltd, 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:331 (the free movement of services); Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v 
Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano ECLI:EU:C:1995:411 (the free-
dom of establishment). AG Jacobs refereed to the test in Konstantinidis; see para 15 of the 
Opinion. 
30 Para 24 of the Opinion.
31 Martìnez Sala is the first case in which the Court referred to Union citizenship as a bear-
er of independent rights, and awarded rights to social benefits to a non-economically active 
EU citizen: Case C-85/96 María Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:1998:217. 
For an academic appraisal, see, inter alia, Ch Timmermans, ‘Martinez Sala and Baumbast 
Revisited’ in MP Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of 
EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 345; J 
Shaw, ‘A View of the Citizenship Classics: Martínez Sala and Subsequent Cases on Citizen-
ship of the Union’ in Maduro and Azoulai (n 31) 356; AJ Menéndez, ‘European Citizenship 
after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More Human But Less 
Social?’ in Maduro and Azoulai (n 31) 363; C Closa Montero, ‘Martínez Sala and Baumbast: 
An Institutionalist Analysis’ in Maduro and Azoulai (n 31) 394.
32 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:2003:539. For an aca-
demic appraisal, see, inter alia, T Ackermann, ‘Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v État 
Belge’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 141; J Verlinden, ‘European Court of Justice, Judgment of Octo-
ber 2, 2003, Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v Etat Belge (The State of Belgium)’ (2004) 
11 CJEL 705.
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ing the importance of EU citizenship as a source of independent rights,33 
also focused on the fact that the children were of dual nationality, which 
represents one of the two exceptions to the (traditional) wholly internal 
situation rule,34 thus extending both the material scope of EU citizenship 
rights to cover the issue of names and their personal scope. In an effort 
to protect the individual, in a manner previously seen in Carpenter,35 
the Court undermined the need to establish an undisputed link between 
breach and exercise of EU rights; it was satisfied with the admission that 
a hypothetical barrier to free movement was a sufficient trigger.36 Both 
the judgment and the Opinion in García Avello applied a strict propor-
tionality test: it was argued that the justifications provided by Belgium 
for the Member State’s inflexibility were not adequate: its aim to promote 
integration and ensure that no confusion arose regarding parentage and 
identity would not have been negatively affected by allowing Mr Avello 
and his wife to pass their surnames on to their children.   
2.2.4 The Grunkin and Paul case 
The third case on EU citizens’ names, Grunkin and Paul, concerned 
a child of German nationality, Leonhard Matthias, who was born in Den-
mark (where the jus sanguinis principle applied) and who had been given 
the surnames of both parents (Grunkin-Paul).37 When the family moved 
to Germany, the local authorities refused to accept the name as reg-
istered by Danish authorities because, under German private law, off-
spring could take only one surname. Advocate General Sharpston in her 
Opinion argued the European space was more than a common market. In 
her examination of discrimination, the Advocate General acknowledged 
that the German measure was not discriminatory, but nevertheless in-
fringed the general principle of equal treatment: although nationality was 
not an issue, there was discrimination based on residence. Following 
this analysis, it was established that failure to accept the hyphenated 
surname would be a future obstacle to the EU citizen’s free movement 
rights. A detail that will be useful later on to understand Runevič-Vardyn 
33 W Maas, ‘Unrespected, Unequal, Hollow? Contingent Citizenship and Reversible Rights 
in the European Union’ (2008) 15 CJEL 265. 
34 The operative word is ‘traditional’. Ever since the conception of the rule, according to 
which an intra-border movement has to take place in order for the application of EU rights 
to be triggered, more exceptions have been noted, of enough substance to argue that the 
Court’s stance may be changing. See, indicatively, A Tryfonidou, ‘In Search of the Aim of the 
EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?’ (2009) 
46 CML Rev 1591.
35 Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:434.
36 E Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards A (non-) Economic European Consti-
tution’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 743.
37 Case C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul ECLI:EU:C:2008:559.
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is that in Grunkin and Paul the Lithuanian government in its submis-
sion argued that – in order to protect their national languages – Member 
States should not have to accept names as spelt by other countries. In 
this particular case, however, it was difficult to imagine how the Ger-
man language would have been affected by the hyphenated surname. The 
Court’s judgment was remarkably similar to Konstantinidis, in that it also 
applied an access to market test and failed to find objective justifications 
for the German practice: Germany’s argument that this practice could 
achieve an element of ‘certainty and continuity’38 was not sufficient.
2.2.5 The Sayn-Wittgenstein case
The last pre-Runevič-Vardyn case on the right to a name, Sayn-Witt-
genstein, involved a question of national constitutional relevance.39 The 
post-Hapsburg Austrian constitution abolished all titles and privileges 
in an effort to create a republic, in effect prohibiting surnames denoting 
nobility. The appellant, an Austrian citizen who had been adopted as 
an adult in Germany and who ran a real-estate business selling castles 
and stately homes in Austria, had changed her name to reflect her adop-
tion. The name included the element Fűrstin von, which did not denote 
nobility in Germany, but did so in Austria. During the 15 years following 
her adoption, the Austrian authorities never challenged the validity of 
her name, and she was issued with a driving licence and established a 
business in Germany under her new name. Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein also 
renewed her (Austrian) passport without incident and received two birth 
certificates bearing her full surname. Thereafter, she was informed that 
Austrian authorities would have to remove the prefix Fűrstin von from 
her name in the Austrian birth register. Advocate General Sharpston 
found no evidence of discrimination, but made it clear that having retro-
spectively to erase a component of a name could create various personal 
and professional inconveniences, especially as it had taken the Austrian 
authorities 15 years to realise their error. Although the AG’s Opinion, 
while recognising the legitimate aim of the Austrian decision, seemed 
more sympathetic towards the individual, the Court was more equivocal: 
it held that the Austrian decision constituted a serious inconvenience for 
Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein and was a breach of the EU free movement provi-
sions. Nevertheless, despite the strict analysis of breach under EU law, 
it found the Austrian rules justifiable under the public policy derogation. 
38 Para 30.
39 For an academic appraisal, see, inter alia, LFM Besselink, ‘Respecting Constitutional 
Identity in the EU: Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von 
Wien, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 
671.
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3 The Runevič-Vardyn case – progeny, substance and aftermath
3.1 Introduction
The latest judgment dealing with the right to one’s name was rendered 
by the Court of Justice in Runevič-Vardyn. For those not familiar with the 
political and legal idiosyncrasies of the case, it may remain just another 
judgment of the Court, touching upon a sensitive matter that is largely the 
domain of national law. Yet, there is more than meets the eye here. As ex-
plained below, this judgment has a peculiar background which is explored 
first, before we move on to a presentation of the case itself.
3.2 Polish-Lithuanian relations: history and current problems 
While one could see that the national law may indeed limit one’s 
human right to identity and private life (language being one of the ele-
ments of such identity), the matter presented in Runevič-Vardyn was not 
limited just to the ad hoc situation of two people of Polish ethnicity. The 
case continues to raise public debate both in Lithuania and in Poland, 
especially as regards the protection of minority rights. In order to under-
stand the implications of the judgment on the diplomatic relations of both 
states, and the importance of such relations in the European integration 
process, it is essential to see where the deeper problems of mutual dis-
content lie. Might they be buried in the common history between the two 
Member States, starting from the Lublin Union in 1569 (which was the 
formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) to the current day?40
The interests of the Commonwealth41 that ‘always took second place 
to the grievances of the magnate factions against the king’,42 the military 
threats from Russia, and the ‘spirit of capitulation’ from King Stanislaw 
Augustus43 were the main reasons why the Polish-Lithuanian co-feder-
ation was not strong enough internally or externally, and why it ceased 
to exist in 1795. The land was then divided by Russia, Prussia, and the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the foreign rule until the end of WWI, 
both nations sought inspiration in their history and language in order to 
become independent states. When in 1915 Germany occupied Lithuani-
an and Polish territories (the part of the greater Russian Empire territory 
40 N Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Volume 1: The Origins to 1795 (2nd edn, 
OUP 2005).
41 See the troublesome reform to introduce a modern (for those days) Constitution, which 
failed in 1791 (adopted only with one-third of the Sejm deputies present). Despite its un-
fortunate fate, the Constitution was praised by the Western countries and it was the sec-
ond in the world (after the UK Constitution) to regulate citizens’ rights and duties; see JA 
Gierowski, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth Century: From Anarchy to 
Well-Organised State (Nakladem 1996) 231–55.
42 ibid 234.
43 ibid 260–61.
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known as the Ober-Ost),44 both Lithuania and Poland fought against Ger-
man oppression, at the same time finding it difficult to agree about the 
land around the current south-eastern part of Lithuania, including the 
capital Vilnius, which continued to cause problems during 1920–1939. 
After 22 years of independence (1918–1940), ‘Lithuania was seized by the 
Soviet Union during World War II, and border changes have left it with 
a Polish minority [of 7%] of the population’,45 which became quite influ-
ential in Lithuania’s political and social life. The Polish minority ‘enjoyed 
rather broad cultural autonomous rights in the Soviet Lithuania’;46 it was 
part of the Communist regime and not in favour of the restoration of 
Lithuania’s independence in the 1990s. At the same time, a quasi-inde-
pendent contemporary Poland (not part of the Soviet Union but under its 
heavy influence) was left with an ethnic Lithuanian minority in the land 
bordering the south-east of current Lithuania (Suwałki).
As the winds of change swept Central and Eastern Europe, Lithu-
ania gained independence, while Poland regained its sovereignty.47 Lithu-
ania freed itself from the collapsing Soviet Union, while Poland ceased 
to be the latter’s satellite state.48 The first step towards diplomatic rela-
tions between the two independent neighbours was the Treaty on Friend-
ly Relations and Good Neighbourly Cooperation (TFRGNC),49 signed in 
April 1994.50 Article 13(2) of the Treaty ensured ethnic minorities in both 
states had the right (individually or collectively) to express, preserve, and 
develop their cultural, linguistic, and religious identity in a free manner 
and without any discrimination, while Article 14 of the Treaty further 
established that this included the right to use one’s name and surname 
according to the sound of the ethnic minority language [emphasis added]. 
Detailed rules on personal names were to be set out in a special bilateral 
treaty; however, such a treaty has not been drafted until today.51 The 
44 M Jučas and others, Lietuvos Istorija: Nuo Seniausių Laikų Iki 1917 Metų [Lithuanian His-
tory: From the Oldest Ages to 1917] (Mokslas 1988) 176.
45 ‘Lithuania Hails EU Court Ruling in Spat Over Polish Names’ (EUbusiness.com, 12 May 
2011).
46 Ž Dambrauskaitė and others, ‘Lithuanian-Polish Relations Reconsidered: A Constrained 
Bilateral Agenda or an Empty Strategic Partnership?’ (2011) 26 LFPR 100, 128.
47 See further T Snyder, ‘The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Since 1989: National Nar-
ratives in Relations Among Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine’ (1998) 4 NEP 1; T Sny-
der, ‘National Myths and International Relations: Poland and Lithuania, 1989-1994’ (1995) 
9 EEPS 317.
48 See, inter alia, G Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism 
in Eastern Europe (OUP 1993); TG Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed 
in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague (Atlantic Books 2014).
49 Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourly Cooperation, UNTS Vol 1851 (2001) 
1-31485, 3-50.
50 V Sirutavičius, ‘Lithuanian-Polish Strategic Partnership: Genesis and Prospects’ (2001) 
7 LFPR 1.
51 One of the current reciprocal claims from Poland is for Lithuania to change its law in this 
regard because Poland has done so.
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TFRGNC also continued the commitments necessary for the future mem-
bership of NATO and the EU, which until 2010 acted as a distraction52 
from the underlying unsolved issues of territories53 and minorities. 
In the early years of independence, Poland concentrated on build-
ing foreign relations with the Visegrad countries.54 However, once an EU 
member, between 2007 and 201055 it began forging alliances with Swe-
den, Germany and France, while Lithuania was looking for partnerships 
with the Baltic and Nordic countries.56 The mood of ‘friendly cooperation’ 
changed, especially after 9/11, which presented Poland and Lithuania 
with a competitive opportunity to prove their loyalty to the US,57 while 
Russia came to be seen by both as a partner in economic cooperation 
rather than as an enemy.58 This has obviously changed in the light of 
Russia’s neo-imperialist policy and annexation of Crimea in 2014.
In the past ten years, the main points of disagreement between 
the two Member States have currently included not only the spelling of 
names and land restitution,59 but also a poor investment climate and 
politicised trade relations over the privatisation of PKN Orlen.60 Amend-
ments to the Law on Education approved by the Seimas in March 2011 
are also not satisfactory in the eyes of Poland, even though, outside Po-
land, ‘Lithuania is probably the only place in the world where education 
52 A Valionis and others, ‘From Solidarity to Partnership: Lithuanian-Polish Relations 
1988–1998’ (1998) 2 LFPR 7.
53 Current eastern territories of Lithuania and the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine, 
known as Kresy/Eastern Kresy; see Dambrauskaitė and others (n 46) 102.
54 Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic; see ibid 104.
55 Including, inter alia, the opt-outs from the Treaty of Lisbon, developing and finalising 
the Eastern Partnership Initiative, Jerzy Buzek’s election as the President of the European 
Parliament; see ibid 113.
56 ibid 114.
57 Poland’s and Lithuania’s ‘support for US military intervention in Iraq and allegations of 
hosting interrogation camps on Polish and Lithuanian soil ... create[d] a controversial image 
of both countries within the EU’; ibid 107–08. See also D Farwick, ‘Barack Obama’s Deci-
sion on Missile Defense’, The World Security Network (1 October 2009).
58 In February 2010 the long-term agreement between Russia and Poland on gas deliveries 
was signed. This was supplemented with visa regime simplification for the residents of the 
RF Kaliningrad Region, the development of a Belarus-related policy, and aspects of partner 
cooperation in the framework of the EU Eastern Partnership initiative. See ‘Lithuania Hails 
EU Court Ruling in Spat Over Polish names’ (n 45).
59 In Šalčininkai, over 95% of land has been restituted, and the same is true of the Trakai 
and Vilnius districts. However, the town of Vilnius is problematic due to miscellaneous 
business interests; Dambrauskaitė and others (n 46) 137. For an outline of the current 
problems, see M Narbutt, ‘Lietuvių Ir Lenkų Brolybės Nebeliko Nė Pėdsako [Lithuanian and 
Polish Brotherhood Vanished Without a Trace]’ Lrytas.lt (29 October 2010).
60 BNS, ‘Lietuvos URM Apkaltino Lenkijos Pareigūnus Skelbiant Klaidingą Informaciją 
[Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Accuses Polish Officials of Promulgating False Infor-
mation]’ Alfa.lt (21 October 2010).
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from school to university level may be obtained in Polish’.61 The issue of 
the Polish minority in Lithuania became prominent on the agenda of the 
Civic Platform62 and the Law and Justice parties in Poland63 and con-
tinues to be presented as a ‘hot topic’ by media and politicians in both 
Member States.64 
3.3 Runevič-Vardyn: the final countdown
Having looked at the politics of Polish-Lithuanian relations, it is 
worth moving to the legal background of the Runevič-Vardyn dispute. The 
starting point is Article 14 of the Lithuanian Constitution providing that 
the state language is Lithuanian, which has priority over any other lan-
guage. According to a long-standing doctrine of the Lithuanian Constitu-
tional Court, the legal regulation of human rights, including definitions, 
contents, and implementation, must be regulated only by primary legisla-
tion; this also applies to the core rules on spelling names and surnames 
in Lithuanian passports.65 At the moment, such primary legislation does 
not exist. The Civil Code does state that ‘every person shall enjoy the 
right to a name’,66 while at the same time making the reservation that 
the spelling of any name acquired through marriage is to be governed by 
secondary legislation on civil metrication,67 which is to take into account 
primary legislation on the spelling of names. Unfortunately, the primary 
legislation of which the Constitution speaks and which is to be the ba-
sis for secondary legislation on civil metrication does not exist.68 Despite 
this gap, there are related laws on ID cards69 and passports,70 as well as 
61 DELFI, ‘E. Lucasas: Lietuvoje Gera Būti Lenku [E. Lucas: It Is Good to Be Polish in 
Lithuania]’ Delfi.lt (21 February 2011).
62 The ex-Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s party, in power (coalition) with the Polish People’s 
Party until October 2015; BBC, ‘Poland Re-Elects PM Donald Tusk’ BBC News (10 October 
2011).
63 The late president Lech Kaczynski’s party, where Radosław Sikorski was his greatest 
rival (Sikorski was the Minister of National Defence (2005–2007) in Jarosław Kaczyński’s 
Cabinet; later the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Donald Tusk’s Cabinet and Speaker of the 
Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament).
64 See, inter alia, W Borodzicz-Smolinski and V Jurkonis, ‘Lithuania and Poland: Lost in 
Translation’, Europe’s World (11 April 2012).
65 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania No KT7-S4/2014 of 
27 February 2014 on clarifying certain aspects of the Decision of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Lithuania of  21 October 1999 concerning the spelling of names and sur-
names in passports of Lithuanian citizens (TAR, 2014, No 2336), Part III, para 8.
66 Article 2.20(1) of the Lithuanian Civil Code.
67 See Articles 3.31, 3.281 and 3.282 of the Lithuanian Civil Code.
68 Article 8 of the Decree of the Minister of Justice No 1R-160 of 19 May 2006 concerning 
the confirmation of the civil metrication rules (Žin, 2006, No 65-2415). This article was writ-
ten when the law was being negotiated in the Seimas (June 2015).
69 Law No IX-577 of 6 November 2001 concerning identity cards (Žin, 2001, No 973417), as 
amended (Žin, 2008, No 76-3007).
70 Law No IX-590 of 8 November 2001 concerning passports (Žin, 2001, No 99-3524), as 
amended (Žin, 2008, No 87-3466).
15CYELP 11 [2015] 1-45
executive decrees (secondary legislation) on passports71 and civil regis-
tration rules.72 The latter specify that all entries on certificates of civil 
status must be made in Lithuanian,73 and that for Lithuanian citizens 
the information stated on identity cards and passports must be entered 
in Lithuanian characters, whereas the names on marriage certificates of 
non-Lithuanian nationals ‘may be entered in accordance with the entries 
made in the [applicant’s] passport ... or in any other equivalent docu-
ment’74 issued by that other State. 
The relevant current secondary legislation is the Decree of the Su-
preme Council75 concerning the writing of surnames and forenames in 
passports of Lithuanian citizens. It was scrutinised by the Constitution-
al Court in 1999,76 in the light of Articles 18, 22, 29, and 3777 of the 
Lithuanian Constitution. The challenge was based on the fact that the 
names of Lithuanian nationals (both from Lithuanian and other ethnic 
backgrounds) on their passports were spelt using only the Lithuanian 
alphabet. The Court referred to the already mentioned Article 14 of the 
Constitution, which guarantees the constitutional status of the Lithu-
anian language,78 and stated that the Decree of the Supreme Council 
did not regulate the private life of persons,79 concluding that the writing 
of names in the Lithuanian passports fell outside the domain of private 
life. Allowing the writing of names in foreign alphabets, according to the 
Constitutional Court, would not only infringe the constitutional princi-
ple of state language embedded in Article 14 of the Constitution, but 
71 Decree No I1031 of the Lithuanian Supreme Council of 31 January 1991 concerning the 
writing of surnames and forenames in passports of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania 
(Žin, 1991, No 5132).
72 Decree No IR294 of the Minister for Justice of 22 July 2008 confirming the civil registra-
tion rules (Žin, 2008, No 883541).
73 Para 11 of Decree No IR294.
374 Paragraph 3 of Decree No I1031.
75 The Supreme Council was a transitional body that exercised sovereignty prior to Lithu-
ania’s full independence.
76 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 1999 on 
the constitutionality of the decision of 31 January 1991 of the Supreme Council concerning 
the spelling of names and surnames in passports of Lithuanian citizens (Žin, 1999, No 90-
2662).
77 18: commitment to human rights and freedoms, 22: the right to private life, 29: equality, 
37: rights of ethnic minorities.
378 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 1999 on 
the constitutionality of the decision of 31 January 1991 of the Supreme Council concerning 
the spelling of names and surnames in passports of Lithuanian citizens (Žin, 1999, No 90-
2662), para 4. See also the Decision No 14/98 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania of 6 November 2009 on the explanation of the Decision of 21 October 1999 (Žin, 
2009, No 134-5859), Part III, para 4.
79 Decision No 14/98 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 Novem-
ber 2009 on the explanation of the Decision of 21 October 1999 (Žin, 2009, No 134-5859), 
para 6.
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also impede the proper functioning of state institutions, which would 
in turn make it difficult for all citizens to exercise their rights and legal 
interests.80  As the Decree applied to all citizens equally, irrespectively of 
their ethnic background or other distinguishing factors, it was held to be 
non-discriminatory and constitutional.81 In this way, it seems, the Con-
stitutional Court ruled on the basis of formal equality, without address-
ing the possible de facto discrimination between Lithuanian nationals of 
different ethnicities.
In 2004, the same Decree was challenged as infringing the interna-
tional human rights rules to private life. Michal Kleckovski, an ethnic 
Pole, who was born on 7 December 1969 in Lithuania, claimed the Lithu-
anian law contradicted Articles 17, read alone and in conjunction with 
Articles 2, 26 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).82 Until the end of the Soviet rule in 1991, his name was 
recorded officially in Lithuanian and in Russian, but since Lithuania’s 
independence in 1991, the applicant had only been able to use his name 
as spelt in Lithuanian (even though the Polish pronunciation was pre-
served). In its defence before the ICCPR, Lithuania pointed out that Mr 
Kleckovski’s claim was:
manifestly ill-founded because the author’s uncle, Tadeus 
Kleckovski, previously submitted the same matter to the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights which declared it inadmissi-
ble on 31 May 2001 as manifestly ill-founded and not disclos-
ing any appearance of a violation of article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (right to privacy),83 taken alone 
or in conjunction with article 14 (principle of non-discrimina-
tion in the enjoyment of the Convention rights).84
Thus, the ICCPR Commission refused Kleckovski’s claim on juris-
dictional grounds: minority rights were outside the scope of ICCPR pro-
80 ibid, para 7.
81 See F Palermo, ‘Judicial Adjudication of Language Rights in Central, Eastern, and South-
Eastern Europe: Principles and Criteria’ (2011) 2 EDAP. On the concept of substantive 
equality, see C McCrudden and S Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-discrimination 
in Europe: A Practical Approach (European Commission/European Network of Legal Experts 
in the Field of Gender Equality, no date); C Nikolaidis, The Right to Equality in European 
Human Rights Law: The Quest for Substance in the Jurisprudence of the European Courts 
(Routledge 2014).
82 Kleckovski v Lithuania, Comm 1285/2004 (HRC 2007).
83 As Račkauskaitė notes, the European Convention on Human Rights, too, does not cover 
minority rights; the possibility to extend the scope of Article 8 (the right to private life) for 
this purpose is quite limited, according to the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (eg Mentzen v Latvia App no 71074/01 (ECHR 7 December 2004)); see Račkauskaitė 
(n 14) 365.
84 Kleckovski (n 82) para 4.5.
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tection. As the problem remained,85 it was no surprise that in 2007 Ms 
Runevič-Vardyn initiated a case against Lithuanian authorities for their 
refusal to spell her name on civil registration documents in Polish. This 
time, similar questions were posed to the Court of Justice.
3.4 The Runevič-Vardyn case
Against this political and legal background we shall now proceed 
with an analysis of the Runevič-Vardyn case. The starting point is a brief 
overview of the factual background, which is followed by an analysis 
of the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen and the judgment of the 
Court of Justice.
3.4.1 Factual background 
The Runevič-Vardyn case was brought before the Court of Justice 
when a Lithuanian national of Polish origin, who was married to a Polish 
national and lived in Belgium, requested that her name in her marriage 
certificate be spelt using the Polish version of the name, Małgorzata Ru-
niewicz-Wardyn. Given that the Lithuanian alphabet did not have the let-
ter ‘W’, and that Lithuanian laws stipulate that forenames and surnames 
must be entered in official documents using the spelling and rules of the 
official language of the country, Ms Runevič-Vardyn’s request was reject-
ed. More particularly, in all birth certificates issued since her birth, Ms 
Runevič-Vardyn’s name had been spelt in accordance with a Lithuanian 
custom, in this form: `Malgožata Runevič´. She, however, argued that the 
original birth certificate was written in the Cyrillic alphabet and referred 
to her Polish ethnicity, as did her passport, issued in 2002. Moreover, she 
also acquired a birth certificate from the Polish authorities, bearing the 
Polish spelling of the name, in 2006. 
85 Runevič-Vardyn was not the first such case in Lithuanian courts, where changing of 
one’s name after marriage became problematic. On 30 June 2011, the First District Court of 
the City of Vilnius refused to admit a case JV involving a Lithuanian national, who married 
an Austrian national and requested her marriage certificate and passport to contain the let-
ter ‘W’ in her name. The refusal was appealed at Vilnius County Court and later at Vilnius 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Lithuania, both of which did not uphold the 
claim. See the decision of Vilnius Court of Appeal of 8 November 2013 (Case No 2A-1304-
232/2012) and the decision of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 17 July 2013 (Case No 
3K-3-392/2013). The European Foundation of Human Rights (EFHR) estimates that more 
than 16% of marriages registered in Lithuania are mixed (one spouse is a foreign national); 
there was also an increase from 1% to 16% of children born outside Lithuanian territory 
from 2001 to 2011. For personal accounts in mixed marriage families about the difficul-
ties caused by the current rules, see the submissions to the legislative deliberations to the 
Seimas Committee of Legal Affairs from Miglė Vantens and Bart Pauwels & Ernesta Pauv-
els; see Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo teisės ir teisėtvarkos komitetas. Pagrindinio komiteto 
išvados dėl Lietuvos Respublikos vardų ir pavardžių rašymo dokumentuose įstatymo pro-
jekto (Nr XIIP-1675) 2015 m gegužės 6 d Nr 102-P-17 [Committee on Legal Affairs, Conclu-
sions of the Main Committee regarding the Draft Law No XIIP-1653 on writing names and 
surnames in official documents (5 May 2015, 102-P-17)].
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In 2007, Ms Runevič married Mr Lukasz Pawel Wardyn in Lithuania. 
The Lithuanian marriage certificate spelt the husband’s name with a ‘W’, 
but the wife’s name was spelt with a ‘V’. When the claimant requested the 
certificate be corrected in order to show the Polish spelling, she was told 
that this would be impossible.
Ms Runevič-Vardyn initiated legal proceedings against the decision, 
and the case was eventually referred by the Lithuanian court to the Court 
of Justice under Article 267 TFEU. The couple claimed that, as their 
names stood, they were experiencing practical difficulties (‘serious in-
conveniences’) in Belgium when receiving post on behalf of each other, 
arranging common banking services, registering for academic confer-
ences, reserving flights, booking hotels, entering into legal contracts, or 
performing any other action on each other’s behalf, such as registering 
their children for school.86 The first two questions in the case related 
to the interpretation of Directive 2000/43/EC,87 and asked whether the 
Lithuanian practice was indirectly discriminatory against nationals of 
other Member States whose names were written without their diacriti-
cal marks, and, more generally, whether the rule for civil documents to 
be written only in the official language was discriminatory. Two further 
questions concerned the compatibility of the Lithuanian rules on spelling 
of names on IDs with Articles 21(1) and 18(1) TFEU. 
3.4.2 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen
Having stated the facts, AG Jääskinen promptly referred to the cu-
rious historical and political context of the case, including the interwar 
conflict around the south-eastern part of Lithuania. This reference was 
enough to distinguish Runevič-Vardyn and Sayn-Wittgenstein from previ-
ous cases on the spelling of names. These two cases were not just about 
the right to one’s name in the context of the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms; they concerned potentially sensitive issues, or, as rightly put 
by AG Jääskinen, ‘keen emotions’.88 Both cases touch upon the issues 
central to national constitutional identity: language and the equality of 
all individuals. The Advocate General unsurprisingly repeated the usual 
maxim: the Member States have jurisdiction over matters of civil law, 
but they should respect EU law when exercising that discretion.89 Given 
that Lithuania joined the European Union relatively recently, it could 
not have been expected to have amended its entire legal system, includ-
86 ibid.
87 Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] 
OJ L303/16.
88 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 5.
89 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
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ing the documents which were issued prior to joining the EU. Moreover, 
the Advocate General addressed the potential applicability of Directive 
2000/43/EC and found that its scope extended to areas where the EU 
has competences, but civil matters were not included in these areas.90 
Consequently, notwithstanding the claimants’ views that the discrepancy 
in spelling may prevent them from enjoying full access to goods and ser-
vices in the Union, the Advocate General found no substantive evidence 
of such a risk. He ascertained that the matter in the main proceedings 
was one of different spelling, which, nonetheless, allowed for a connec-
tion to be drawn between the two versions of the name. 
Further, with regard to the applicability of the non-discrimination 
provisions, AG Jääskinen established that, in terms of Ms Runevič-
Vardyn’s birth certificate, there was nothing to suggest she had been 
discriminated against, as she was a national of the Member State that 
issued her document. In other words, this was a wholly internal situa-
tion. Her husband, on the other hand, could have suffered discrimination 
because of the refusal to use Polish diacritical marks in his name on the 
Lithuanian marriage certificate. Regarding his inability to pass the Polish 
name onto his legal spouse, AG Jääskinen regarded this argument as in-
compatible with the general principle of equality between the sexes under 
EU law, but he agreed that in similar situations Lithuanian nationals of 
Lithuanian ethnicity would be more favourably treated, as their names 
would be clearly compatible with the Lithuanian language and its spell-
ing rules. On the freedom of movement, AG Jääskinen argued that Ms 
Runevič-Vardyn’s claim to barriers to free movement was unsubstanti-
ated because her birth certificates were issued in her country of origin, 
while Mr Wardyn’s rights to free movement had not been restricted, as 
the omission of diacritical marks was a common occurrence, practised 
for reasons of simplicity.
The Opinion was thus far rather unsurprising and predictable. 
When AG Jääskinen reached the justification part, he rightly acknowl-
edged that Member States had the right to adopt laws with a view to 
protecting their languages as a matter of public policy. However, he went 
on to say that the Lithuanian measure did not pass the proportionality 
test: Lithuania’s efforts to amend its laws governing the spelling of names 
and surnames, which will be the focus of Part 3.6 of this paper, were 
seen as clear evidence that there were less restrictive measures than the 
one adopted. Furthermore, although the diacritical marks, or absence 
thereof, were not regarded as an obstacle to free movement, it was argued 
that the situation was different when letters were omitted just because 
90 As per Article 3, Directive 2000/43/EC applies to employment related situations.
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they did not exist in an alphabet. In the latter instance, the Lithuanian 
argument seemed inconsistent: the letter W was allowed in Mr Wardyn’s 
name, but the same treatment was not afforded to his wife. Therefore, it 
is difficult to see how the Lithuanian language was in danger.
3.4.3 Judgment of the Court of Justice
The Court grouped the first two questions, which dealt with the ap-
plicability of Directive 2000/43/EC, and reached the same conclusion 
as the Advocate General, using a similar rationale. It, too, mentioned 
the travaux préparatoires, which were clear in their admission that the 
Directive did not apply to civil law cases rationae materiae.91 Thus, Ms 
Runevič-Vardyn could not rely on this Directive. Similarly, the remaining 
questions were addressed together, and the Court, much as the Advocate 
General did, divided the arising issues into three distinct groups:
1. The first concerned Ms Runevič-Vardyn’s claim to have her 
name spelt in the Polish manner in her marriage and birth 
certificates (Runiewicz); 
2. The second was the request of both claimants that Mr War-
dyn’s surname, ‘joined to the maiden name of the first appli-
cant’, be spelt using the Polish spelling (Runiewicz-Wardyn); 
3. The third was Mr Wardyn’s request that his surname be en-
tered in the marriage certificate in the original, Polish spelling 
with diacritical marks (Łukasz Paweł Wardyn).92 
The Court’s judgment did not differ much from the AG’s Opinion. With 
regard to the balance between protecting Lithuania’s right to its linguistic 
tradition and the need to ensure that the measure it had taken was a pro-
portional intervention in the right to personal identity of EU citizens, the 
Court’s reasoning is interesting and noteworthy in its own right, because it 
wondered why Lithuania would agree to use the letter ‘W’ for Mr Wardyn (a 
Polish national), but would refuse to do the same for Mrs Vardyn (a Lithu-
anian national of Polish ethnicity) when there were clearly no technical or 
other barriers. The Court acknowledged the need to protect the Union’s 
rich heritage, but repeated that such efforts should not affect the rights of 
the Union’s citizens disproportionately. Nevertheless, it left for the national 
court to apply the proportionality test.93 Thus, as far as the first issue 
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was evidence of a breach of free movement rules, Lithuania could refuse to 
amend the spelling subject to a proportionality test. 
As for the second claim, the Court held that the decision on using 
the same spelling for both spouses would depend upon the existence of 
a serious inconvenience caused by the use of two distinct spellings. Ac-
cording to the Court, the responsibility for reaching a decision whether 
the inconvenience was serious rested with the national court.94 
With regard to the third issue, the Court held that the decision of 
Lithuania to refuse to amend the marriage certificate, so it was compat-
ible with the original spelling that included diacritical marks, was not a 
breach of free movement rights, because such marks are often omitted 
owing to the design of technical equipment. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Court followed the reasoning of the 
Advocate General and endeavoured to apply the relevant provisions con-
sidering their aim, but also to respect the law of Lithuania, by ruling 
that the national court should apply the proportionality test to discern 
whether the national measure is too strict a practice. The Advocate Gen-
eral was admittedly rather more explicit when he opined that there were 
other measures, which were less harsh than the Lithuanian one,95 but 
the Court followed a more timid approach. The final section of this part 
will endeavour to analyse the two distinct views and the lessons learnt, 
before the analysis moves on to Lithuanian attempts to amend the na-
tional laws concerning names.
3.5 Application of the CJEU’s judgment by the referring court and 
the exportability of the judgment to relations between the Member 
States 
Having looked in detail at what happened in the Luxembourg court-
room, it is now fitting to analyse how the referring court in Lithuania 
applied the judgment of the Court of Justice. On 18 August 2011, the 
First District Court of the City of Vilnius96 refused the request of the ap-
plicants to amend their surnames and forenames as they appeared on 
the certificates of civil status.97 While it acknowledged that the different 
spelling of Ms Runevič-Vardyn’s name did cause inconveniences related 
94 Para 78.
95 Para 84.
96 Vilniaus miesto 1 apylinkės teismas; the court of first instance.
97 First District Court of the City of Vilnius Press Release, ‘Teismas Nusprendė, Kad 
Pavardės Dokumentuose Turi Būti Rašomos Lietuviškais Rašmenimis [The Court Decided 
That Names in Official Documents Must Be Spelt in Lithuanian Letters]’ (18 August 2011) 
<http://www2.lat.lt/portal/start.asp?act=news&Tema=49&str=48028> accessed 14 Sep-
tember 2015.
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to the proof of identity in her daily life, it stressed that this situation 
was the result of the conscious behaviour of the applicant herself. Even 
though Ms Runevič-Vardyn had a Lithuanian birth certificate (where 
her name was spelt in Lithuanian characters), while residing in Poland, 
she changed her identity-certifying documents into ones that codify her 
name in the Polish alphabet in order to introduce herself to the academic 
community in Poland.98 Having finished Lithuanian secondary school, 
Ms Runevič-Vardyn then moved to Poland to become a well-established 
academic.99 While she did experience objective practical difficulties living 
in the EU after marriage, according to the Lithuanian court these diffi-
culties could easily be solved by providing the relevant institutions with 
supplementary documents confirming personal identity: the Lithuanian 
marriage certificate that is translated into the relevant language.100 Rely-
ing on the above, the national court held that the applicants experienced 
only ‘regular’ personal/domestic inconveniences because of the current 
spelling of their names. These were not ‘serious inconveniences’ at the 
administrative, professional, and private levels that could render national 
law inapplicable.101 Therefore, according to First District Court of the City 
of Vilnius, the national law on the spelling and writing of names of Lithu-
anian citizens was applicable to Ms Runevič-Vardyn and did not contra-
dict EU law. 
The outcome at the Lithuanian court is not surprising, given the 
discretion awarded by CJEU, as well as ECtHR, jurisprudence. Having in 
mind the expected accession of the EU to the ECHR,102 it is quite possible 
that the CJEU might have been influenced indirectly103 by the ECtHR 
judgment in Metzen v Latvia,104 which left wide discretion for national 
courts and other institutions on how to spell the names of ethnic minority 
Latvian nationals. In Lithuania, the start of the litigation did not prevent 
debates on necessary legislative reform; thus, the Runevič-Vardyn judg-
98 ibid.
99 TIGER, ‘Dr. Malgorzata Runiewicz-Wardyn’ (no date) <http://www.tiger.edu.pl/english/
onas/runiewicz/cv.htm> accessed 22 August 2014.
100 First District Court of the City of Vilnius Press Release (n 97).
101 See para 76 of the Runevič-Vardyn case.
102 Article 6(2) TEU.
103 Interestingly, this case was mentioned neither in the AG’s Opinion nor in the CJEU’s 
judgment.
104 As noted earlier, according to Article 53(2) CFR, the Charter rights corresponding to the 
ECHR (ie the right to a private life) must be interpreted in the light of ECtHR jurisprudence. 
As far as the latter is concerned, the case of Mentzen v Latvia is of relevance. The ECtHR 
awarded a large margin of appreciation for the national authorities in a post-communist 
state (Latvia) and held that the breach of the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR was 
proportional in order to protect the state language, which is a constitutional national value 
(in the same way as state territory, organisational structure, or a national flag is).
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ment continued to be explored while discussing proposals for revision of 
the law on names in the Seimas during 2007–2015. At the same time, the 
lawyers representing Mr Wardyn and Ms Runevič-Vardyn were continu-
ing to pursue their case via Lithuanian courts. As the State Commission 
of the Lithuanian Language has refused to adopt a position that differs 
from the previous rulings of the Constitutional Court, another claim by 
Ms Runevič-Vardyn is currently pending before the same court that is the 
sole interpreter of the Lithuanian Constitution. At the moment, it seems 
that this is the only hope that many Lithuanian ethnic Poles have.105 
3.6 Runevič-Vardyn and legislative reform in Lithuania: what for 
the future? 
As the judicial route was not successful, what about progressive leg-
islative reform? What would it mean for Polish-Lithuanian relations and 
European integration if such reform does not take place? These are the 
questions to which we turn next. 
Given the complicated history, there is no surprise that debates on 
the new Lithuanian law on the spelling of names have been continu-
ing since 2007. Naturally, there are two competing views. The first is to 
give priority to the Lithuanian language (the status quo camp), while the 
second aims for a more inclusive option (the liberal camp). The latter, 
reflected in the opinion of Šimašius,106 observes that the writing of one’s 
name and surname in the original language is a human right, which 
must be ensured as long as it is in line with public order and does not 
add any additional cost to taxpayers.107 Šimašius believes that, despite 
the CJEU’s ruling in favour of the existing law, there is a need to intro-
duce a legislative change.108 He makes a reference to a pre-WWII Lithu-
ania, where foreign alphabets were commonly used in all newspapers,109 
even though the 1922 and 1938 Lithuanian Constitutions, just like the 
current Constitution, protected the Lithuanian language as the state 
105 BNS, ‘Lietuvių Kalbos Komisija: Už Užsieniečių Ištekėjusioms Moterims Reikėtų Leisti 
Pase Rašyti Originalias Pavardes [The State Commission of the Lithuanian Language: Wom-
en Married to Foreign Nationals Should Be Allowed Original Surnames in Their Passports]’ 
Delfi.lt (20 March 2013); ELTA, ‘Ieškant Sprendimo Dėl Nelietuviškų Pavardžių Rašybos 
- Dar Vienas šnipštas [Looking for Solutions on Writing Non-Lithuanian Surnames: One 
More Dead End]’ Delfi.lt (30 October 2013).
106 The Minister of Justice of Lithuania 2008–2012.
107 Granickas (n 20).
108 BNS, ‘R Šimašius: Reikia Nuleisti Garą Diskusijose Dėl Nelietuviškų Raidžių [We Need to 
Let Off Steam in Discussions on Non-Lithuanian Letters]’ Zebra.lt (24 November 2011).
109 ibid. 
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language.110 Moreover, Lapinskas111 points to the official, contemporary 
Lithuanian grammar rules,112 which allow the use of the letters Q, W, X 
(and even Ä, Ö, Ü, Å) in non-Lithuanian words, especially in a person’s 
name. Palermo, too, observes the shortcomings of the Lithuanian law and 
the unwillingness of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court in the past to 
protect the human right to a name. In his view, the Constitutional Court 
adopted a formal reading of equality, 113 leaving minority rights ‘remark-
ably limited’.114 
Next to the liberal human-rights-based argument, Poland has of-
ten stated that, in the spirit of the TFRGNC, ethnic Poles in Lithuania 
should be allowed to spell their names in the Polish alphabet.115 Lithu-
ania, on the other hand, has always relied on the literal interpretation 
of the TFRGNC and pointed out that in some of the countries where the 
ethnic Polish population was much larger than in Lithuania (Germany, 
France, the UK, the Czech Republic, the US, Brazil, and Ukraine) none 
of the ethnic minorities were allowed to have their names in the origi-
nal language in official documents.116 However, one could say that in a 
democratic state based on the rule of law, the incentive for human rights 
protection should be the rights themselves, not the fact that another EU 
Member State requires reciprocity under bilateral treaties. 117
For the above reasons, while the national court awaited the judg-
ment from the CJEU in Runevič-Vardyn, there were initiatives for legal 
changes emerging in the Lithuanian parliament (the Seimas) and the 
Constitutional Court. In 2009, ten years after the Constitutional Court’s 
Decision that upheld Lithuanian rules on the spelling of citizens’ names 
as constitutional,118 the Seimas again turned to the Constitutional Court, 
110 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania No KT7-S4/2014 of 
27 February 2014 on clarifying certain aspects of the Decision of the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Lithuania of  21 October 1999 concerning the spelling of names and sur-
names in passports of Lithuanian citizens (TAR, 2014, No 2336), Part III, para 6.4.
111 A Lapinskas, ‘Dar Vienas Raidės W žygis į Lietuvišką Rašybą [One More Quest by the 
Letter W into Lithuanian Spelling]’ [2012] Delfi.lt.
112 V Ambrazas (ed), Dabartinės Lietuvių Kalbos Gramatika [Contemporary Lithuanian Gram-
mar] (Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidykla 1994).
113 See the Constitutional Court’s judgment discussed above.
114 Palermo (n 81) 18.
115 Dambrauskaitė and others (n 46) 135.
116 Granickas (n 20).
117 E Lucas, ‘Dialogue of the Deaf Between Vilnius and Warsaw’, The Economist (London, 10 
February 2012).
118 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 1999 on 
the constitutionality of the decision of 31 January 1991 of the Supreme Council concerning 
the spelling of names and surnames in passports of Lithuanian citizens (Žin, 1999, No 90-
2662). 
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asking it to explain in more detail paragraphs 4119 and 7120 of the above 
Decision. In particular, whether it was possible on a Lithuanian passport 
to state a person’s name using non-Lithuanian characters, after having 
stated the same name in Lithuanian first, in situations where the person 
in question requests so and provides Lithuanian authorities with the per-
sonal identification documents issued abroad. The Constitutional Court 
ruled that, as long as the general rule was observed – that all names must 
be spelt in the Lithuanian alphabet121 – it was possible for a legislator 
to exercise its discretion to allow the original name to be written in any 
other parts of the document (passport), as long as the name was written 
in Latin characters.122 However, the Constitutional Court stressed, the 
name spelt in a foreign language did not amount to a record of personal 
identity in the state’s official language,123 despite the calls for a different 
approach by Lithuanian citizens of the Polish minority.124
As already mentioned, besides the constitutional law jurisprudence, 
there were also legislative initiatives. In 2007, the Lithuanian Govern-
ment made a proposal to the Seimas to revise the law, in order to allow 
‘for names in passports, personal IDs, and other documents to be spelled 
in all Latin-based characters125 … without any additional write-ups in 
Lithuanian’.126 This was followed by four later legislative proposals, all of 
which are summarised in the table below.
119 ‘In Lithuanian passports, a person’s name and surname must be spelt in the state lan-
guage.’
120 ‘Allowing the writing of names in foreign alphabets would not only infringe the consti-
tutional principle of state language, but also impede upon the proper functioning of state 
institutions.’
121 Decision No 14/98 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 Novem-
ber 2009 on the explanation of Decision of 21 October 1999 (Žin, 2009, No 134-5859), Part 
III, para 6.
122 Decision No 14/98, para 7.
123 Decision No 14/98, para 8.
124 Palermo (n 81) 18.
125 The Russian-speaking minority would not have names in Cyrillic.
126 Palermo (n 81) 18.
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Lithuanian academic commentary analysing the above proposals is 
very scarce,127 which illustrates a lack of informed intellectual debate 
not only in state institutions (courts, the Seimas) but also in public dis-
course. In mainstream media, some points have been made by Egidijus 
Kūris, the current Lithuanian judge at the ECtHR. He argued that Son-
gaila’s and Kubilius’s bills were not appropriately prepared and scruti-
nised in the sitting of the Seimas on 8 April 2010; neither was an attempt 
made to discuss the provisions before a vote was taken on whether to 
adopt or reject the proposals, nor were there any further discussions 
about redrafting the proposals.128 The proposal by Kubilius would have 
allowed for any names registered in Lithuania to be spelt in any letters 
of the Latin alphabet, whereas Songaila proposed non-Lithuanian names 
to be written in a special section of Lithuanian passports, which would 
not be equal to the ‘official’ Lithuanian spelling in the main section of the 
passport. The latter option of the spelling of names has been implement-
ed in Latvia. However, Latvia is the only EU Member State that has such 
a regulation, and it has attracted criticism from the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Committee.129 According to Kūris, Songaila’s proposal would 
not be a satisfying solution, as it would not change the current status 
quo, where one’s identity is divided between ‘private-self’ and ‘public-
self’, meaning that the current legislative vacuum vis-à-vis writing names 
in Lithuania ‘undermin[es] an ability to choose a language [and] de facto 
leads to the deprivation of a possibility of being yourself’.130 Besides, this 
proposal does not reflect the changed societal and political situation in 
contemporary Europe, where ‘the liberal ideology coupled with the pro-
tection of human rights resulted in a definitive shift of the default posi-
tion on the states’ engagement with their societies: tolerance and respect 
came to replace aggressive social constructivism’.131 
Kūris seems to be more positive towards Kubilius’s proposal, which, 
even though contradictory to the Constitution, allowed for conditions of 
the materialisation of an individual freedom to decide how s/he wants 
his/her name to be spelt in a Lithuanian passport. In the words of Kūris, 
this proposal ‘would have meant the possibility to belong to the Lithuani-
127 There is some literature in the field of Lithuanian language studies, eg P Kniūkšta, 
Tarp Gramatikos Ir Politikos [In Between Grammar and Politics] (Lietuviu kalbos institutas 
2013). However, legal analysis of the legislative proposals is non-existent, except for some 
thoughts in E Kūris, ‘Abėcėlės Nelaisvėje [Detained by the Alphabet]’ Delfi.lt (25 February 
2013).
128 Kūris (n 127).
129 In Raihman v Latvia, Comm 1621/2007 (HRC 2010), the UNHRC declared a violation of 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
130 Kochenov and others (n 1) 175.
131 ibid.
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an civic nation independently of one’s ethnic origin’.132 This view is closely 
linked to Penot’s analysis stemming from the CJEU’s ‘names cases’ that 
‘European citizenship is ... not about creating a European identity, but 
about protecting the particular identity of the migrant’;133 it is about ‘pro-
tecting and encouraging dual (more generally, multiple) memberships, 
one defined by nationality and the other one by residence’.134
After the Lithuanian parliamentary elections in 2012, the newly 
formed government committed to resolving the issue of the spelling of 
names. Point 246 under the ‘Ethnic Minorities’ title of the Government’s 
Programme for 2014–16135 outlined pledges to prepare a legislative pro-
posal for the Law on Ethnic Minorities; to create a special Government 
Department to represent ethnic minorities; and to resolve the questions of 
writing names and surnames in identification documents and of writing 
street and town names in minority areas. According to the Programme, 
all legislation was to be drafted taking into account the provisions of 
the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM), discussed earlier in this article. 
As a result of the Programme, there were two legislative proposals 
submitted to the Seimas. The first was registered on 1 April 2014, a day 
before the Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius’s visit to the 
then Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, where the latter expressed hope 
that the issue would be resolved in time to mark the 20th anniversary of 
the signing of the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Good Neighbourly 
Cooperation.136 This proposal aimed to allow any Latin characters to be 
used on the main page of Lithuanian passports (the liberal camp).137 The 
second proposal that came before the Seimas on 4 April 2014 was less 
ambitious: it allowed names with foreign letters to be written on a sepa-
rate, ‘non-official’ passport page (the status quo camp).138 Thus, it seems, 
132 Kūris (n 127).
133 AI Penot, ‘The Transnational Character of Union Citizenship’ in M Dougan and NN 
Shuibhne (eds), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart 2012) 
26.
134 ibid 34.
135 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo 2012 m. gruodžio 13 d. nutarimas Nr. XII-51 “Dėl 3lietuvos 
respublikos vyriausybės programos” (Žin, 2012, No 149-7630). 
136 ELTA, ‘Lenkijos Premjeras Reikalauja A Butkevičiaus Spręsti Lenkų Problemas Lietuvoje 
[The Polish Prime Minister Demands A Butkevicius to Solve Polish Problems in Lithuania]’ 
Delfi.lt (2 April 2014).
137 XIIP-1653, put forward by two members of the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, 
Gediminas Kirkilas and Irena Šiaulienė.
138 XIIP-1675, authored by the members of Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Demo-
crats Valentinas Stundys and Rytas Kupčinskas, seemed to have higher political consen-
sus: it was put forward by all Seimas fractions, with the exception of one political party – the 
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania. BNS, ‘Originally-Spelled Name on Separate Passport 
Page “No Solution”’, TheLithuaniaTribune.com (12 April 2014).
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in 2014 the Lithuanian Parliament was, in the words of Robert Frost, 
between two roads diverging in a yellow wood:139 the very same roads that 
had been trodden on in the legislative proposals of Songaila and Kubilius 
of 2009.
During the mentioned state meeting, Butkevičius gave his word to 
Mr Tusk that the relevant legislation would be passed by May 2014. How-
ever, given the two competing proposals and the 2014 European Parlia-
ment elections, the debate in the Seimas was postponed until June,140 
leaving the empty diplomatic promise as an April Fool’s legacy, lasting 
well into summer 2015. It is now clear that the Prime Minister under-
estimated how long such a sensitive issue would take to legislate upon. 
The aim of the legislative initiatives this time – as compared to the 
2007–2012 proposals – was not only to agree on the primary legislation, 
but also to confirm secondary rules that would have to be approved by 
the Government. The two legislative proposals seem to have generated a 
wide and open debate, both in the Seimas and in public discourse, which 
is a positive development. As the deliberations on the status quo camp 
proposal had been suspended on 6 May 2015,141 the focus in May and 
June 2015 was on the liberal proposal. Despite this, it is still difficult 
to predict how much the original text will be amended until it passes in 
the Seimas. Whether the end result will represent proportionately the 
changed Lithuanian society since 1991 is another question, as is indeed 
whether Poland – and in particular the Lithuanian Polish ethnic minority 
– will be entirely happy with the result embedded in the final text.
4 The right to a name in the CJEU’s case law: the aftermath of 
Runevič-Vardyn
4.1 Introduction
Having looked at the idiosyncrasies of the political and legal context 
of the case, as well as the case of Runevič-Vardyn itself, we now take a 
more holistic approach and place this analysis against the previous ju-
risprudence of the Court discussed earlier in this article. As a first step, 
we shall endeavour to explore two pathways the Court of Justice could 
have followed: EU citizenship and fundamental rights. This will lead us 
139 R Frost, ‘The Road Not Taken’ in Mountain Interval (Henry Holt and Company 1920).
140 BNS, ‘Pavardžių Rašybos Klausimą Valdantieji Nutarė Atidėti Iki Birželio [The Question 
of Name Writing Has Been Postponed Until June]’ KaunoDiena.lt (23 April 2014).
141 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo teisės ir teisėtvarkos komitetas. Pagrindinio komiteto 
išvados dėl Lietuvos Respublikos vardų ir pavardžių rašymo dokumentuose įstatymo pro-
jekto (Nr. XIIP-1675) 2015 m. gegužės 6 d. Nr. 102-P-17. [Committee on Legal Affairs, Con-
clusions of the Main Committee regarding the Draft Law No XIIP-1653 on writing names and 
surnames in official documents (5 May 2015, 102-P-17)].
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to evaluate this line of jurisprudence through the lens of well-established 
discourse on European integration and national identities. 
4.2 EU citizenship or fundamental rights?
The Court’s approach to individuals’ names has demonstrated ele-
ments of coherence, or at least a tendency towards judicial precedent: 
Sayn-Wittgenstein made references to García Avello and to Grunkin and 
Paul, while the latter made reference to García Avello and to Konstantinid-
is. This is to be expected, as the Court tends to refer to past case law to 
establish legitimate expectations and formulate a convincing and sound 
argument,142 although the extent to which this happens convincingly has 
been questioned.143 There are a few leitmotifs running through all these 
cases, although, as will be shown, they do not necessarily consolidate 
the Court’s modus operandi for the protection of the right to a name in 
EU law.
The first leitmotif is the inclusion of EU citizenship in the rationale as 
the main driver of the judicial reasoning (excluding, of course, Konstanti-
nidis which was decided before the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht). 
This inclusion was arguably a pragmatic choice, given the combination 
of the questions asked by the referring courts (ie the interpretation of the 
citizenship provisions), and the fact that some of the cases concerned the 
rights of minors, where EU citizenship could be the only source of inde-
pendent rights.144 Pragmatism notwithstanding, this leitmotif is loyal to the 
Court’s teleological and functionalist approach, and indicative of a clear 
move towards citizenship rhetoric even in cases such as Sayn-Wittgen-
stein, where the appellant could have benefited from Article 56 TFEU (the 
freedom to provide services). More importantly, the right to a name was 
formulated as a right to be protected by EU law, presumably covered under 
‘inter alia’ in Article 21 TFEU, in a development consistent with the notion 
of constitutional dialogue between the CJEU and national courts, and one 
which ‘elevate[s] the constitutional tone of the reasoning highlighting the 
fundamental right to a name as a presiding principle’.145 Although sub-
sequent Opinions of Advocates General and judgments have not devoted 
much time to a discussion of the legal sources of the right to a name, AG 
142 U Šadl, ‘Case-Law: Ruiz Zambrano as an Illustration of How the Court of Justice of the 
European Union Constructs its Legal Arguments’ (2013) 19 EuConst 205.
143 U Šadl and S Hink, ‘Precedent in the Sui Generis Legal Order: A Mine Run Approach’ 
(2014) 20 ELJ 544.
144 For independent rights for minors, see Case C-200/02 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man 
Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2004:639; and Case 
C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
145 S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: The Impact of the Entry into Force of 
the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 1565, 
1579.
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Jacobs’ Opinion in Konstantinidis did so in a very eloquent manner. His ar-
guments about a wider reading of Article 8 of the ECHR (and now also Arti-
cle 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) coupled with the constitutional 
traditions of a number of Member States which protect dignity and the 
right to be given a name, made it clear that the scope of EU law could not 
exclude the said right. As far as the personal scope is concerned, this was 
enlarged to encompass non-economically active citizens, including minors, 
who now have non-derivative, express rights. This idea was introduced in 
Zhu Chen and later re-emerged in Ruiz Zambrano.  
There is thus evidence of the Court’s effort to promote and protect 
one’s right to a name, as a means to self-determination and personal 
identity. However, differently from the ECHR and the ICCPR systems, 
this right in EU law developed not so much as part and parcel of the right 
to private life, but qua EU citizenship and consideration of EU citizens as 
economic actors in the internal market, ie as part of individual economic 
liberties. Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest the existence of an 
imperialistic approach, or of ‘a linear, strategic action [...]’146 by which 
the Court was treating the right to a name as a fundamental right to be 
weighed against national constitutional traditions. Only the Opinion of 
Advocate General Jacobs in Konstantinidis had a fundamental rights fo-
cus, but the other cases on identity did not engage in a discussion of fun-
damental rights, and those which did, did so merely en passant. Instead, 
they followed a more traditional approach, underlying the rest of the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence on free movement: a discrimination test was ap-
plied first, and when there was no evidence of different treatment, a mar-
ket access test was introduced to examine whether there was a serious 
inconvenience in exercising Treaty rights. Arguably, the market access 
test, already present in the jurisprudence on other market freedoms,147 in 
conjunction with the inclusion of minors and the ‘serious inconvenience’ 
test, makes for an early version of the more recent ‘genuine enjoyment’ 
test, formulated in Ruiz Zambrano. Perhaps, in the pre-Lisbon era, the 
judges were governed by the simple fact that the ECHR was not formally 
part of the EU legal order and, during the first years of its existence, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was non-binding. 
Surely, reliance on general principles of EU law was already a standard in 
the Court’s jurisprudence, yet at that stage of the European integration 
the judges at Kirchberg were very much oriented to the development of 
EU citizenship. Logically, thus, a combination of internal market princi-
ples with EU citizenship was a good way forward. 
146 D Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional 
Change’ (2005) 68 MLR 233, 265.
147 For an overview, see C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (3rd 
edn, OUP 2010) 19–25.
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However, the legally binding Charter introduced a major change in 
the legal landscape, which the Court of Justice has been exploring con-
sistently, yet at times in a ‘sense and sensibility’ fashion.148 The judges 
seem to be very much aware of the Charter’s potential and, at the same 
time, the risks that come with it. On the one hand, the binding Charter 
provides for a long missing (and awaited) bill of rights for the European 
Union. On the other hand, it can be perceived as a potential vehicle for 
competence creep and an increase of powers for the European Union. 
Prima facie, the Member States have fortified their national competences 
sufficiently with Article 6 TEU and Article 51 of the Charter. Yet, in cases 
where matters are reserved for the competence of the Member States, they 
must exercise such competence having regard to EU law. This is a well-
established doctrine that the Court of Justice developed, for instance in 
relation to direct taxation.149 As far as the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is concerned, the Court of Justice famously ruled in Fransson150 that 
the Charter applies whenever the Member States act within the scope of 
EU law. This does not mean, though, that judges will always rely on the 
Charter. On the contrary, the choice of legal sources is made carefully, as 
the Runevič-Vardyn case proves. Left with the choice of which path to fol-
low, the Court of Justice opted for the citizenship/internal market path. 
This way, it diverted farther from the general trend set by the Strasbourg 
Court and, by the same token, avoided the risk of being accused of step-
ping into domestic competence in such a sensitive area and using the 
Charter as a Trojan horse. 
There is no doubt that the principle of attributed powers has domi-
nated the Court’s reasoning in the cases on the right to a name. It is no-
table that the Court has consistently held that the registration of names 
falls under the discretion of the Member States. Yet, following the line of 
jurisprudence mentioned above, it made clear that the Member States 
had to respect EU law and its principles when exercising national sover-
eignty. It is notable that Lithuania was one of the Member States which 
submitted views during the Court’s proceedings in Sayn-Wittgenstein, en-
deavouring, on the one hand, to explain why national measures such as 
148 See S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (CH 
Beck-Hart-Nomos 2014).
149 See, inter alia, L Cerioni, The European Union and Direct Taxation: A Solution for a Dif-
ficult Relationship (Routledge 2015).
150 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105. For an academic 
appraisal, see, inter alia, M Szwarc, ‘Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
the Context of Sanctions Imposed by Member States for Infringements of EU Law: Comment 
on the Fransson Case’ (2014) 20 EPL 229; J Vervaele, ‘The Application of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and its Ne bis in idem Principle in the Member States of the 
EU’ (2013) 6 REALaw 113; B Van Bockel and P Wattel, ‘New Wine into Old Wineskins: The 
Scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU after Åkerberg Fransson’ (2013) 6 EL 
Rev 866.
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those in question in these cases were needed, and, on the other hand, 
to caution the Court about where the Union’s competence lies. One can 
hardly see the point in such a defensive attitude, given the Court’s pre-
vious jurisprudence on names and the restraint it exercised there. The 
CJEU was willing to acknowledge that the spelling of names was an is-
sue of national jurisdiction, but also that it was within its jurisdiction 
to ensure that the EU law was respected. In some cases it made recom-
mendations, such as in Grunkin and Paul, where the Advocate General 
suggested that Germany adopt a more flexible law which would allow for 
the principle of mutual recognition to be upheld. 
A second leitmotif of the names cases is the variety of approaches 
to proportionality. The proportionality test was a central element of the 
judgment in Runevič-Vardyn, and in the national context it was rath-
er problematic, or at least questionable. In all the cases examined pre-
Runevič-Vardyn, the Court ruled that the national measures were not jus-
tified and not proportionate. The only exception was Sayn-Wittgenstein, 
where the Court was less lenient than Advocate General Sharpston151 
and ruled in favour of the Austrian measure, because of the constitu-
tional character of the rationale presented by the Austrian government. 
This seems to have swayed the decision, and is certainly not against 
the usual distinction between the strict and soft proportionality tests to 
which the Court resorts when dealing with sensitive issues.152 However, 
the seemingly random manner in which this distinction is being drawn is 
potentially problematic: in Grunkin and Paul the Court was not convinced 
by Germany’s arguments that their refusal to accept the name Grunkin-
Paul had to do with protecting the German language; and the measure in 
Garcìa Avello was also dismissed because Belgium could not adequately 
or satisfactorily justify its actions. In Runevič-Vardyn, however, Lithu-
ania was given more leeway, despite the fact that it seemingly arbitrarily 
refused to allow Ms Vardyn to have her name spelt as she saw fit. 
Arguably, there is an element of incoherence and inadequate citizen 
protection in the practice of names cases. The varying approach to the 
proportionality test is characteristic of the Court’s tendency not to go 
against national constitutional courts or principles which are protected 
151 Although AG Sharpston acknowledged the legitimacy of Austria’s motives, she asked 
the referring court to consider the inconvenience caused to Ms Sayn-Wittgenstein, taking 
into account the fact that the contested prefix did not denote nobility in Germany, and that 
there was a 15-year gap between the issuing of the first birth certificate and the decision to 
amend her name.
152 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen 
Grogan and others ECLI:EU:C:1991:378; Case C-36/02 Omega (n 28); Case C-34/10 Oli-
ver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV ECLI:EU:C:2011:669; Case C-137/09 Marc Michel Josemans 
v Burgemeester van Maastricht ECLI:EU:C:2010:774; Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata 
Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECLI:EU:C:2001:616.
34 Egle Dagilyte, Panos Stasinopoulos, Adam Łazowski: The Importance of Being Earnest...
by the constitutions,153 as a safeguard against the possibility of a direct 
feud with constitutional courts which could undermine the authority and 
binding character of the Court’s judgments.154 However, this ad-hoc ap-
plication of EU law may put into danger legitimate expectations and legal 
certainly in the long term.
A final leitmotif in the CJEU’s cases on names is the lack of export-
ability of any of these judgments: it may be difficult for national courts in 
other Member States to see how these judgments may apply in their na-
tional setting. Similarly to the cases brought by the Commission against 
individual Member States where enforcement proceedings rarely have 
ramifications for other Member States,155 the above case law tends to 
concern either the transposition of EU law into national legal orders, or 
the invalidity of national laws which contradict EU law. In the former – 
transposition – scenario, the territorial applicability of the cases concern 
the Member State which failed to adopt a law in accordance with the orig-
inal EU provision, and, thus, rarely affect other Member States directly, 
even if they have adopted potentially unsuitable laws. This is because 
it is highly unlikely that two or more Member States will adopt national 
laws with the same nature or degree of unsuitability or unlawfulness, 
and, therefore, each case will have to be judged on an ad hoc basis. The 
invalidity scenario is more complicated as it can, under certain circum-
stances, affect more than one Member State.156 
Runevič-Vardyn is significant because it is an exception to these two 
scenarios: it does not concern an incorrect transposition of an EU direc-
tive, but neither does it concern an expressly contradicting national law. 
Rather, it demonstrates how an issue derived from a national law may 
have deeper roots in the complex history of European integration and 
may affect the relations between Member States, calling for a fine bal-
ance between intra-state relations in the EU and the aims of the Court of 
Justice. On the one hand, the Court must ensure the law of the Union is 
applied and respected, consistently and uniformly; on the other hand, it 
153 See Case C-159/90 Grogan (n 152). 
154 D Chalmers and others, European Union Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010) .
155 A good exception to this is Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350 and Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land 
Niedersachsen ECLI:EU:C:2008:189. Both cases concerned the transposition of the Post-
ed Workers’ Directive in the Luxembourgish and German legal orders, respectively, but, 
nonetheless, may have effects which will be evident even outside the territories of these 
countries. See further C Barnard, ‘The UK and Posted Workers: The Effect of Commission v 
Luxembourg on the Territorial Application of British Labour Law’ (2009) 38 ILJ 122.
156 An indicative example is the case of the acquisition of nationality, where there are two 
types of national laws: ius sanguinis and ius soli. There is currently no single regime in the 
EU, which means that one Member State’s laws on the acquisition of nationality may easily 
affect another’s immigration policy. See a follow-up to Chen and Zhu where Ireland changed 
its laws on nationality to avoid further abuse of the existing system.
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must allow Member States to safeguard their cultures and languages.157 
Next to this, these two goals also need be reconciled with the right to pro-
tect the rights of EU citizens, one of them now being the right to a name 
as a form of identity. Rodin, too, sees Runevič-Vardyn as an expression 
of a tension: on the one hand, language as part of the national constitu-
tional identity via Article 4(2) TEU; and, on the other hand, freedom of 
movement qua Article 21 TFEU, in combination with the right to privacy 
laid down in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights158 and the 
principle of non-discrimination (Articles 18 and 19 TFEU). As the next 
section will demonstrate, such a balance is not always easy to reach, and 
the Court may deliver a judgment which is unsatisfying in its effort to 
please all interested parties. 
The presentation and examination of these three leitmotifs has put 
Runevič-Vardyn in its appropriate judicial context: despite the common-
alities, there is still an element of divergence in the case law, and Runevič-
Vardyn is a perfect example of this. As already noted, the Opinion of the 
Advocate General and the judgment of the Court of Justice differ in terms 
of tenacity and guidance on the proportionality test: the Court left more 
discretion to the national court, whereas the Advocate General was more 
explicit about the alternative of more proportionate measures that would 
not jeopardise Lithuania’s efforts to protect its language and heritage.159 
It is difficult to understand the Court’s argument when the Opinion of the 
Advocate General covers the question of proportionality sufficiently and 
demonstrates that the obstacles the citizen in question may encounter 
can be unnecessarily strict. Perhaps it is just another episode when the 
Court of Justice took the already mentioned ‘sense and sensibility’ ap-
proach, aiming not to position itself on a collision course with some of the 
Member States and, at the same time, risk a threat to its legitimacy. It is 
notable, though, that the Estonian160 and Polish161 governments agreed 
with the Advocate General in their observations in Runevič-Vardyn.162 
This indicates a stand of some Member States towards more human-
rights-based treatment of ethnic minorities.
As already discussed, Lithuania took steps to amend its laws at the 
time of the Runevič-Vardyn dispute. Advocate General Jääskinen sug-
gested that these efforts demonstrate that the national measure failed the 
157 See Articles 167 TFEU and 4(2) TEU.
158 S Rodin, ‘National Identity and Market Freedoms after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 7 
CYELP 11.
159 Paras 84, 87.
160 Para 82.
161 Para 99.
162 Although the AG did not accept Poland’s submission, according to which it was possible 
for institutions of Member States to fail to identify a link between the different spellings on 
a certificate owing to unfamiliarity with the letters used in the said document.
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EU proportionality test, hence needed reforming in the light of EU law. 
An alternative reading is that Lithuania considered the judgment and, 
although favourable, it decided to amend its laws on identity documents 
anyway. Whichever reading one chooses, the question remains whether 
the Court should have been more critical (despite the fact that Lithuania 
decided to revisit its laws), or whether the Court was right in following a 
cautious approach and allowing the national legislator to make the final 
decisions. Therefore, one may ask whether the judgment is unnecessarily 
devoid of any legal bite, and whether this could be amended via citizen-
ship and fundamental rights paradigms.
One explanation is that the Court was trying to respect Lithuani-
an’s right to protect its heritage: the reason why it afforded the national 
court such leeway is because the aforementioned right was of a consti-
tutional nature. This is supported by other examples of similar national 
protectionism to which the Court has not objected in the past, such as 
the protection of a national language (Case C-379/87 Groener), abor-
tion (Case C-159/90 Grogan) or human dignity (Case C-36/02 Omega; 
Case C-34/10 Brüstle). However, one could also argue that there is the 
outstanding issue of common sense: the Lithuanian authorities used 
the character ‘W’ in the case of Mr Wardyn, meaning that it is techni-
cally possible to include letters of a non-Lithuanian Latin-based alpha-
bet in marriage certificates. This cannot be explained by saying that Ms 
Runevič-Vardyn was a Lithuanian national and thus her case is one of 
reverse discrimination: while certain elements of the case were confined 
within Lithuanian territory, there was a sufficient link with the exercise 
of EU rights because the family lived in Belgium.
This divergence in potential readings of the Court’s judgment is 
more inexplicable when the earlier case law is considered. Although the 
Runevič-Vardyn judgment made references to previous names cases, it 
did so only in order to reiterate the maxim that the decisions regarding 
names are national ones, but should nevertheless respect EU law. Apart 
from this obvious admission, the remainder of the case law actually pro-
vides different advice from the final outcome in Runevič-Vardyn. In García 
Avello, the Court found it impossible to accept Belgium’s practice because 
it had no objective justification. In Grunkin and Paul, just like Runevič-
Vardyn, the national government used the protection of language as a 
justification. Here, the Court did not accept that a composite surname 
was incompatible with protecting the language, making Runevič-Vardyn 
hard to fathom. How would the use of one letter dilute a national lan-
guage, or ‘the nation’s identity, [...] integration of citizens, [...] the expres-
sion of national sovereignty, the indivisibility of the State [...]’,163 when 
163 Para 84.
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there was no total general ban on using any Latin letters not existing in 
the Lithuanian alphabet? 
Finally, although in Runevič-Vardyn the Court refers to citizenship 
and its fundamental status,164 it does so only while discussing the appli-
cable EU law provisions. The remainder of the judgment is preoccupied 
with the breach of EU law, while the proportionality test is rather thin. 
Although the rights deriving from the status of citizenship are described 
as fundamental, there is an implicit conviction on behalf of the Court 
that the right to a name, derivative as it might be, and the right to family 
life for EU citizens are both subservient to the Lithuanian constitution-
al tradition. This hierarchical treatment is inherently problematic, not 
least because of the confusion it creates vis-à-vis supremacy of EU law, 
a situation which has been delightfully likened to the premise of the play 
‘Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf’.165 As a corollary, citizenship in Runevič-
Vardyn is viewed as a mere codification of pre-existing (market) rights, 
and lacks a Charter-based fundamental rights dimension.
4.3 European Integration and European identities: quo vadis?
So far, this article has examined the case law on the right to a name, 
demonstrated how Runevič-Vardyn fits within that framework, and es-
tablished the historical and political background within which the case 
emerged and the impact it has had on Lithuanian legislative reform. 
Based on the arguments made thus far, two axes of analysis can be de-
duced. Firstly, whether the current state of affairs regarding the fun-
damental rights balancing act is working; secondly, how a conceptual 
framework with a focus on a discussion of citizenship as a facilitator for 
integration could provide an answer to the said balancing act. These are 
the questions to which we now turn.
With regard to the first element, there were five Member States which 
submitted observations in Runevič-Vardyn, four of which joined the EU 
in 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia. Most of them 
have problems with protecting the rights of their nationals who belong to 
ethnic minorities.166 The disagreements on minority rights in Lithuania 
and Poland, as outlined in Runevič-Vardyn, are resonant in international 
164 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment ECLI:EU:C:2002:493; Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat Bayern 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
165 D Sarmiento, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the 
New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1267.
166 The Roma in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; the Hungarian minority in Slovakia; the 
Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia. See, inter alia, K Topidi, ‘The Limits of EU Condi-
tionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia’ (2003) 1 JEMIE 1; DJ Smith, ‘Minority Rights, Mul-
ticulturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia’ (2003) 1 JEMIE 1; P Vermeersch, 
‘EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’ (2003) 1 JEMIE 1.
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relations between other Member States, too. It is sufficient to point out 
Hungary v Slovakia167 to illustrate just how difficult it is to reconcile the 
recent history of the post-communist democracies in the EU.168 The lat-
ter case concerned Slovakia’s refusal to allow the Hungarian President to 
enter the country, because the purpose of his visit was to give a speech 
in an area which housed a large Hungarian minority. This was not helped 
by the fact that the visit was scheduled for 21 August, the anniversa-
ry of the Warsaw Pact invasion of the then Czechoslovakia. The Court 
based its judgment on international law rules governing visits of heads of 
states, thus limiting the scope of EU law, a finding that goes against ‘its 
own precedents’169 both in terms of the supremacy of EU law over inter-
national law and on the fundamental status of citizenship. Moreover, the 
judgments in Hungary v Slovakia and Runevič-Vardyn seem to have been 
separated from their historical workings, and show signs of functional-
ism as opposed to teleology: in both cases, the Court tried to find the 
least politically upsetting way out. Runevič-Vardyn illustrates perfectly 
the Court’s problematic approach to citizenship and fundamental rights 
protection in how to reconcile national constitutional values with the Eu-
ropean Union legal order, but also national traditions and idiosyncrasies. 
Although the EU has taught Member States to cooperate to an unprec-
edented degree and to do so without being blinded by purely national 
interests,170 there is still an underlying impression that Member States 
see EU citizenship and its accompanying rights as a type of superimposi-
tion of EU law on their national legal orders.  
While minority rights are now protected by the Charter’s equality 
provisions,171 it is debatable whether these rights would be deemed as 
important as the protection of a national language.172 The question, of 
course, is whether this balance is acceptable and, if not, how this state 
of affairs can be corrected. Admittedly, one could easily argue that the 
Court has in the past followed relatively sound legal reasoning to justify 
free movement derogations based on constitutional traditions, or that Ar-
167 Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovak Republic ECLI:EU:C:2012:63. For a commentary, see 
M Filippin, ‘A Change for Future Intra-European Diplomatic Relations? Case C-364/10 
Hungary v Slovak Republic, Judgment of 16 October 2012, not yet reported’ (2013) 20 
MJECL 120; LS Rossi, ‘EU Citizenship and the Free Movement of Heads of State: Hungary 
v Slovak Republic’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1451.
168 For an extensive discussion on minority rights in the EU and in Europe, see GN Toggen-
burg, Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward (LGI Books 
2004).
169 Rossi (n 167) 1460.
170 T Kostakopoulou, ‘Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe’ (1996) 4 JPP 
337.
171 Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
172 H Van Eijken, ‘Case C-391/09 Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn 
v Vilniaus Miesto Savivaldybes Administracija and Others, Judgment of the Court (Second 
Chamber) of 12 May 2011’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 809. 
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ticle 4(2) TEU which ensures that the Union respects the identities of the 
Member States – which include a national language – allows the Court to 
afford Member States considerable leeway. However, the cases mentioned 
previously, Grogan and Groener, were decided prior to the adoption of the 
Charter, and the Court is proving to be reluctant to use the Charter as 
a means to challenge previous precedent and introduce a new balance 
between fundamental rights and principles and national constitutional 
traditions. There is a danger that by prioritising the latter, the supremacy 
of EU law may be questioned. EU law has been enjoying supremacy since 
Costa v ENEL,173 but the Court is often very reluctant to challenge con-
stitutional courts or constitutional traditions (the Omega Spielhalen and 
Brüstle cases) despite it expressly arguing that ‘rules of national law, even 
of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effective-
ness of EU Law on the territory of that State’.174 This was painfully visible 
in Melloni, where the hierarchical position of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was – ever so controversially – elevated.175 While supremacy of EU 
fundamental rights may remain a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’176 in the eyes 
of some national constitutional courts, this cannot distract us from the 
fact that although the Court usually uses common constitutional tradi-
tions to qualify fundamental freedoms, this does not mean that every tra-
dition, no matter how central to a constitution, automatically qualifies for 
common constitutional tradition status. The only consolation is that the 
Court’s current restrictive approach can find some support in the issue of 
EU competences: the EU has no legislative competence to set standards 
on minority protection (including the rules on how to spell individual 
names), except the prohibition of non-discrimination that is limited to the 
field of employment.177 There is, therefore, a considerable, and difficult to 
explain, gap in the legislation.178 
Given that fundamental rights may be a politically sensitive area 
for the Court to intervene in, the authors suggest that a solution would 
be to rely on EU citizenship as a facilitator for integration and for the 
promotion of the European project, a project whose evolution is deeply 
rooted in an idealistic interpretation of its founders’ original aspirations, 
as opposed to a concrete idea of justice and equality through citizen-
173 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
174 Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para 59.
175 For an academic appraisal, see, inter alia, N De Boer, ‘Addressing Rights Divergence 
Under the Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1083.
176 LS Rossi, ‘How Fundamental Are Fundamental Principles? Primacy and Fundamental 
Rights after Lisbon’ (2008) 27 YEL 65.
177 T Ahmed, The Impact of EU Law on Minority Rights (Hart Publishing 2011).
178 A similar lack of legislative competence exists for social rights. The Court has been criti-
cised for reaching too deep into national competences with regard to the rights to strike and 
collective bargaining in light of Art 153(5) TFEU. See G De Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsid-
iarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ (1998) 36 JCMS 217, 221.
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ship. EU citizenship can resolve the problem created by the aforemen-
tioned balancing act, because it can offer adequate fundamental rights 
protection without upsetting the EU/Member State balance of power, or 
stretching EU competences. More particularly, instead of allowing the 
Member States to interpret the citizenship provisions as they see fit, the 
Court can convincingly use the effet utile argument and argue that EU 
citizenship cannot function effectively without full incorporation of its 
potential into the acquis; otherwise, the rights deriving from one’s status 
as citizen would be as good as removed.179 In other words, citizenship as 
a facilitator for integration could prevent a situation where there are two 
realities for EU citizens: one rooted in their national citizenship, and one 
in highly ineffective, residence-based EU citizenship, which is triggered 
when there is an intra-border movement (an ‘absurd’180 requirement), a 
deprivation of the genuine enjoyment of rights, or dismissed in favour 
of national constitutional traditions, all situations which undermine the 
ideas of substantive equality. 
The merit of this approach is twofold: it would end the current pre-
occupation with free movement as the only core of citizenship;181 and it 
would also address the current criticisms which suggest that the EU’s 
democratic workings remain unsatisfactory, if not regressive, owing to 
a concentration of powers on institutions whose membership is not a 
result of direct democracy.182 However, this does not take into considera-
tion the view that the Court is legitimising the Union through justice.183 
Even if one argued that the Court was not democratically endowed to 
perform what is essentially a federalising role,184 it would be unfair not to 
recognise the CJEU’s role ‘as [a] reliable agen[t] for equitable settlements 
within and above the nation-state’,185 or its role as an institutionalised 
enforcer of EU law.186 
179 D Kostakopoulou, ‘When EU Citizens Become Foreigners’ (2014) 20 ELJ 447.
180 D Kochenov, ‘The Citizenship Paradigm’ (2013) 15 CYELS 196.
181 S O’Leary, ‘The Free Movement of Persons and Services’ in P Craig and G De Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999).
182 A José Menéndez, ‘Editorial: A European Union in Constitutional Mutation?’ (2014) 20 
ELJ 127.
183 G De Búrca, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union’ (1996) 59 MLR 349; 
A Wiener and V Della Sala, ‘Constitution-Making and Citizenship Practice: Bridging the 
Democracy Gap in The EU?’ (1997) 35 JCMS 595; J Neyer, ‘Justice, Not Democracy: Legiti-
macy in the European Union’ (2010) 48 JCMS 903.
184 K Lenaerts, ‘“Civis Europaeus Sum”: From the Cross-Border Link to the Status of Citizen 
of the Union’ (2011) 3 FMW 6.
185 D Kostakopoulou ‘The European Court of Justice, Member State Autonomy and Eu-
ropean Union Citizenship: Conjunctions and Disjunctions’ in B de Witte and HW Micklitz 
(eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia 
2012) 175.
186 L Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (CUP 2002).
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The current understanding of citizenship as a distinct level of be-
longing, ‘a matter of convenience’,187 is rooted in the at least currently 
unfounded188 fear that EU citizenship may replace national ones, which 
is a corollary of approaching membership exclusively from a statist per-
spective, which is bound to be unworkable and unproductive.189 This was 
evident in Denmark’s declaration submitted to other Member States dur-
ing negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht that the rights attached to 
EU citizenship ‘do not in any way take the place of national citizenship’, a 
concept which ‘will be settled solely by reference to the national law of the 
Member States concerned’, a fear possibly deriving from fact that in Dan-
ish eyes, nationality and citizenship are not separate concepts, although 
this is by no means exclusive to Denmark.190 
Moreover, the Court’s case law on EU citizenship,191 and its influence 
on the EU’s secondary law in the form of Directive 2004/38/EC,192 has 
made it clear that the concept is one closer to the idea of residence than 
that of belonging to a specific national group, because EU citizenship 
has created a community of EU citizens, not bequeathed one. Therefore, 
there is evidence of an unconscious judicially sponsored detachment of 
EU citizenship from national allegiances, which means that Ms Runevič-
Vardyn’s right had little to do with her national loyalties and more to do 
with her links to a European polity as a whole.193 This is another itera-
tion of the concept of independent EU citizenship, one based on the more 
inclusive and fair concept of membership-by-residence, and one which 
should affect the evolution of citizenship in the near future. This idea of 
a common European space has been present in Opinions submitted by 
a number of Advocates General in the past, and certainly after the 2004 
enlargement,194 and the authors argue that the Court should be less will-
ing to offer unqualified support to national loyalties.
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Equally, the principle of substantive equality could form part of our 
view of what constitutes proper balance. The non-discrimination provi-
sions have direct effect; therefore, if read in conjunction with Articles 20 
and 21 TFEU, they could address situations of reverse discrimination,195 
such as the element of Runevič-Vardyn which concerns a claim against 
the applicants’ home country.196 These Treaty articles could also ensure 
that EU citizenship is approached as an independent concept that should 
not be regarded in terms of subjugation, hierarchies, or additionality, 
thereby weakening the odd caveat which currently makes EU citizenship 
provisions subject to limitations found in the Treaty and secondary legis-
lation.197 This lack of subjugation and the resulting independence of EU 
citizenship will not only make its equality element more substantive, but 
will also affect the procedural aspect of applying EU citizenship: the com-
bination of substantive and procedural is what will make EU citizenship 
truly a tool for integration.198 If allowing an EU citizen to initiate a claim 
against their Member State of origin sounds beyond what the Treaty’s 
wording allows, despite the CJEU judgments suggesting otherwise,199 the 
combined reading of Articles 18, 20, and 21 TFEU could act as a means 
towards a more equal citizenship status and would not have worrying 
implications, as it would not lead to an unqualified review of national 
laws.200 
Even if EU residence-based citizenship failed to assist Ms Runevič-
Vardyn in this instance, and even though its current configuration is less 
than ideal, this does not mean it should be dismissed in the future.201 
Rather, any perceived failure should instead be seen as a ‘consequence of 
institutional failure rather than a cause of it’,202 and should thus act as 
a catalyst for change and a re-organisation and re-conceptualisation of 
EU citizenship. The current system is rather fragmented, which becomes 
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clearer if one juxtaposes fundamental rights cases on names with cases 
which concern the implications of the protection of fundamental rights, 
such as Rottmann. If one adds to this mix the national political idiosyn-
crasies and feuds to which this article has referred, then it is obvious 
that the current level of protection is more akin to a mosaic, differing 
from state to state, rather than to a coherently engineered architectural 
creation. 
To summarise, this final section has endeavoured to argue that the 
importance of EU citizenship – and, therefore, its effects – can very sim-
ply be elevated, where EU citizenship provisions are used legitimately 
and transparently as the rationale for extending the scope of EU law. 
EU citizenship law can be interpreted as being able to qualify national 
competences,203 which is not unprecedented: fundamental rights protec-
tion is understood to go beyond the bare minimum,204 even in sensi-
tive areas,205 and any limitations to its effectiveness have to be suitable 
and necessary, and also subject to EU fundamental rights review.206 In 
this way, EU citizenship can be constructed as a fundamental status 
going beyond what is strictly necessary, in other words, embracing its 
full potential. In adopting such an interpretation, the Court would not 
be accused of judicial activism, because this approach would require 
the Court to engage in a more transparent line of reasoning, which in 
turn would be more legitimising. Thus it would ‘strengthen the primacy 
of EU law by [...] stat[ing] the reasons why it decided to follow (or de-
part from) the level of fundamental rights protection provided for by the 
member states’ constitutions’,207 a type of comparative effectiveness test. 
The legitimacy-inducing rights which accompany citizenship are already 
used by the Commission to emphasise the significance of citizenship in 
transforming ideas of belonging, the notion of ‘Other’, and civic member-
ship.208 Furthermore, some of the current jurisdictional tests, such as the 
cross-border movement requirement, were established by the Court with-
out textual basis in the Treaties,209 so the Court should not be unwilling 
to establish a progressive doctrine, in keeping with the evolution of the 
203 Rottmann introduced the idea of qualifying important national competences, which up to 
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Union. EU citizenship, as any citizenship concept, is a ‘dynamic one’,210 
subject to changes ‘in response to changing conceptions of membership 
and evolving definitions of community’.211 Therefore, the need for a new, 
residence-based citizenship model, one offering more protection and one 
closely linked to fundamental rights at the place of residence, is not pie 
in the sky or uncalled for; instead, it is a response to a multi-layered Un-
ion with multiple ideas of belonging and a number of inter-locking legal 
orders. The EU has evolved into being more than a sum of its Member 
States; its citizenship, a wonderfully novel concept, should follow suit.
5 Conclusions
The future of European integration is facing problems, not only eco-
nomic (the Euro crisis), and political, but also societal, such as multicul-
tural, ethnic and religious differences, and the clashing individual iden-
tities of EU citizens. The complexity, as well as the multiplicity, of such 
problems raises serious doubts about the success (short- and long-term) 
of the European project. Looking at the broader picture, it seems that 
Runevič-Vardyn was the trigger which escalated the political differences 
of politicians212 in Lithuania and Poland, damaging diplomatic relations 
between the two Member States. Thus, as the foreign experts note, ‘the 
Polish-Lithuanian theatre of the absurd has more to do with narcissistic 
differences rather than geopolitical and cultural affinity’.213 Given there is 
very low acceptance that non-discrimination on the grounds of national-
ity exists in Eastern European countries,214 one can only imagine what 
this may mean for the treatment of ethnic minorities in many Member 
States in this part of Europe. With the rise of the right-wing parties evi-
denced by the results of the 2014 European Parliament elections, this 
causes concern regarding the lack of acceptance and accommodation of 
the Other in those Member States that see themselves as based on the 
‘restrictive construction of the Volk and a steep rise in petty nationalism, 
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which is state-sanctioned and presented as a norm’.215 This mind-set is 
dangerous not only for individual Member States, but for the whole Eu-
ropean project and calls for a more inclusive concept of European, as well 
as national, citizenship. In the words of Lithuanian poet Tomas Venclova, 
whose native languages are Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian: 
when we are Europeans not only in word but in deed – in 
other words, a self-reliant, self-critical people who respect the 
Other, able and thirsting to grasp our own essence in con-
junction with traditions that are not our own – then, more 
than ever before, we will be Lithuanians as well.216
All these socio-political difficulties notwithstanding, we believe that 
in Runevič-Vardyn the Court of Justice adopted a ‘safe’ approach to the 
issue because of its sensitivity in many post-Soviet Member States and 
the lack of common practice or EU-wide harmonised legislation on the 
spelling of names. The Court has had to face similar challenges in the 
past, and the approach in this case is consistent with its cautious mo-
dus operandi. However, this should not distract us from the fact that the 
Court will inevitably have to address this gap in ethnic minority EU citi-
zen protection. It is neither appropriate nor feasible to do so by introduc-
ing a test to discern which national constitutional traditional is worthy of 
becoming a common tradition, but the Court can certainly act in favour 
of a more inclusive and independent concept of EU citizenship. The most 
important step in this direction is to encourage legal reform towards all-
inclusive substantive equality217 at national level – not only in Lithuania, 
but also in other Member States which face problems in protecting mi-
nority rights. One can only hope that this might be achieved for the ben-
efit of the substantive equality of all European citizens, which is rooted in 
the cosmopolitan character of EU citizenship, underpinned by the Char-
ter. Even if one were convinced that the EU is not ‘citizenship-capable’,218 
it is time to start viewing the EU’s lack of demos and non-conformity to 
statist paradigms as its advantage in creating a new citizenship, and not 
as its weakness.
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